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Today, the distinction between criminal and civil law seems to
be collapsing across a broad front. Although the separation between
criminal and civil cases is a legal creation both imperfect and in-
complete,' this basic division has been a hallmark of English and
American jurisprudence for hundreds of years.
The Constitution, statutes, and the common law all draw fun-
damental distinctions between criminal proceedings, which empha-
size adjudication of guilt or innocence with strict adversarial
protections for the accused, and civil proceedings, which emphasize
the rights and responsibilities of private parties. We have separate
criminal and civil courts, employing different rules of procedure,
burdens of proof, rules of discovery, investigatory practices, and
modes of punishment.2 This distinction is cemented in every law stu-
dent's mind by the division of the law school curriculum into criminal
and civil categories.
Now, however, there is a rapidly accelerating tendency for the
government to punish antisocial behavior with civil remedies such as
injunctions, forfeitures, restitution, and civil fines. Sometimes civil
* Professor of Law, The National Law Center, George Washington University. B.A.
1972, J.D. 1975, Rutgers University; LL.M. 1977, Harvard University.
Author's Note: Funding for this Article was provided by the National Institute of Justice,
U.S. Department of Justice, under contract OJP-86-C-002. Opinions stated in the Article
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
1. See, e.g., Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: I, 43 COLuM. L. REv.
753, 756-60 (1943).
2. See, e.g., Smith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences
of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 3 (1990) (in criminal cases,
unlike civil ones, a defendant can appeal a conviction by alleging legal error favorable to
the government, but the government cannot appeal an acquittal by alleging error favorable
to the defendant).
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approaches completely supplant criminal prosecutions as certain be-
havior is "decriminalized," or as offenders are treated as ill instead
of guilty. 3 More frequently, civil remedies are blended with or used
to supplement criminal sanctions, as evidenced by the widespread use
of forfeiture in drug cases.
4
Many states are using civil law techniques to check domestic vi-
olence,5 drug trafficking, 6 weapons possession, 7 and racial harass-
ment.8 The federal government, through the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 9 is using divestiture and treble
damage actions to strike at businesses run by white collar criminals
and members of organized crime.'0 The federal government also has
3. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 332-54 (1968); Kadish, The
Crisis of Overcriminalization, 347 ANNALS 157 (1967).
4. The federal civil forfeiture rules applicable in drug cases are codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (1988) as part of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 2044 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 18, 19 and 21 of the
U.S. Code). Over 100 federal forfeiture statutes are currently in effect, covering the seizure
of goods and property and encompassing a wide range of activities. The recent explosive
growth of state and federal forfeiture schemes to combat drug offenses and other criminal
activity has spawned a large number of cases and scholarly articles. See, e.g., Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491
U.S. 600 (1989); Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
328 (1988); Note, "A RICO You Can't Refuse:" New York's Organized Crime Control
Act, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 979 (1988) (authored by Ethan Brett Gerber); Note, Constitutional
Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 390 (1988) (authored by Jay A.
Rosenberg); Comment, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related Crimes
Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 303 (1988) (authored by Sean
D. Smith).
The use of forfeiture is well-rooted in the common law. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) I, 14 (1827); Hughes & O'Connell, In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and
Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma,
11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613, 619 (1984).
5. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutes authorizing the issuance
of civil protection orders to curb domestic violence. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46b-15 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1003 to 1006 (1981 & Supp. 1989);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 761 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
6. E.g., Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 932.701-704 (West
1985 & Supp. 1990) (allowing seizure of property on probable cause it was used to transport
contraband).
7. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8102 (Deering 1990 Supp.) (authorizing confis-
cation of firearms in the possession of mental patients).
8. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § llH (West 1986 & Supp. 1990) (authorizing
civil suits by the state seeking equitable relief to remedy civil rights violations).
9. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
10. There is extensive literature addressing both the wisdom and the constitutionality
of the civil RICO law. See, e.g.,Boucher, Closing the RICO Floodgates in the Aftermath
of Sedima, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (1986); Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis
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reinvigorated the qui tam action, which effectively deputizes private
citizens to enforce monetary penalties against persons who have de-
frauded the government."
The idea of using civil remedies to redress criminal behavior is
not new. A criminal who injured or robbed another traditionally faced
two potential trials-a criminal prosecution by the government to
adjudge her guilty and punish her for the offense, and a civil action
by the victim for recompense. 12 Similarly, in the administrative or
regulatory sphere, the federal government long has pursued antitrust
and securities law violators with civil injunctions as well as criminal
complaints.13 Yet the current phenomenon of civil remedies blending
with criminal sanctions never has been more actively or consciously
pursued.
Forfeiture is a case in point. The United States Attorney General
has declared forfeiture a top priority and even has created the Ex-
ecutive Office of Asset Forfeiture to oversee all aspects of the Justice
Department's forfeiture efforts.14 The federal government's use of
forfeiture to seize the proceeds and instruments of crime has grown
so spectacularly that in 1989 alone the amounts forfeited-over $600
million worth of currency, cars, planes, boats, and even cattle-are
twenty times the amounts forfeited just four years earlier.15 In the
past five years, combined state and federal efforts have stripped more
than one billion dollars from drug dealers, and the states are working
for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REv. 827 (1987); Lacovara & Aronow, The Legal Shakedown
of Legitimate Business People: The Runaway Provisions of Private Civil RICO, 21 NEw
ENo. L. REv. 1 (1986).
11. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988) (False Claims Act). A qui tam action is a
statutory suit brought by a private person on behalf of herself and the United States
government to recover damages, penalties, or forfeitures against a third party. The plaintiff
is like a bounty hunter; she has no interest in the controversy other than the statutory
opportunity to share the monetary recovery with the United States. See generally Caminker,
The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989).
12. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS §
2, at 8 (5th ed. 1984); cf. United States v. Dixon, 347 U.S. 381, 385 (1954) ("Clearly
Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act; this
is neither unusual nor constitutionally objectionable.").
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (Sherman Act) (granting jurisdiction to issue injunctions
to prevent and restrain antitrust violations); Comment, Implications of the 1984 Insider
Trading Sanction Act: Collateral Estoppel and Double Jeopardy, 64 N.C.L. REv. 117, 121-
22 (1985) (authored by Jonathan A. Blumberg); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988) (Clayton
Act) (authorizing treble damages in private suits for antitrust violations); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c,
78o, 78t, 78ff (1988) (civil penalties for insider trading violations of securities law).
14. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL FORFEITURE OF THE INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEEDS
OF Cimm: THE PROGRAM IN A NUTSHELL 1 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.D.J. NUTSHELL]. See
generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ASSET FoR-rrURE: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY (1989).
15. U.S.D.J. NUTSHELL, supra note 14, at 1-3.
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to adopt a model forfeiture statute that would further expand their
power and the opportunities to seize property used in crime.' 6
This melding of civil remedies and criminal penalties portends
significant changes in both legal doctrine and the institutions which
are charged with applying and enforcing criminal law. When officials
take into account the objectives of deterrence, recompense, and ret-
ribution, as well as the reality of scarce resources, their range of pos-
sible responses to antisocial behavior now includes a full spectrum
of criminal and civil remedies. Determining the proper mix of these
remedies in order to address a particular problem presents subtle pol-
icy questions and requires resolution of conflicting goals. 17 Moreo-
ver, efforts to mix and match criminal and civil sanctions, especially
in a single proceeding, undoubtedly will require procedural and ju-
risdictional reforms. 8 Indeed, viewing antisocial behavior as a prob-
lem to be met, managed, and resolved by whatever civil or criminal
tools promising may trigger a reexamination of how prosecutors' of-
fices are perceived and organized. 19
16. de Courcy Hinds, States Seek Rougher Drug Forfeiture Laws, N.Y. Times, Jul. 16,
1990, at All, col. I.
17. For example, the remedy of restitution can be used in multiple, and not necessarily
harmonious ways. Sometimes restitution is enlisted to aid the community, sometimes to
assist the offender's rehabilitation, and sometimes to provide recompense to victims. See
Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim In Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 521-
23 (1982).
18. See Note, Crossing the Line Between Rough Remedial Justice and Prohibited
Punishment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, 65 WASH. L. REv. 437,
452-53 (1990) (authored by Lynn C. Hall) [hereinafter Note, Crossing the Line] (noting the
uncertainties that would accompany hybrid criminal-civil trials).
19. Most prosecutors' offices, including United States Attorneys' offices, have separate
civil and criminal branches. They sometimes bridge the divide between their civil and criminal
departments by creating special divisions, offices, or task forces. Many United States
Attorneys' offices have created, for example, special prosecution teams or crime task forces
that are devoted to specific problems, like corruption in a particular industry. These groups
enlist a variety of civil and criminal remedies comprehensively to ferret out crime.
The blending of civil and criminal remedies and strategies may -prompt a review of and
change in how all prosecutors' offices function. The prosecutor's office and law enforcement
generally could be viewed as part of a regulatory process organized around particular subject
areas or criminal "businesses." There would be divisions of environmental enforcement,
consumer fraud enforcement, and drug enforcement, as well as a division for ordinary
common law crimes. Each division would employ both criminal and civil remedies to reach
the systemic supports of criminal behavior, as well as the behavior itself.
In a similar vein, there is growing interest in developing police resources to identify the
causes or patterns of crimes and to formulate responses designed to contain or eliminate
the behavior. See Anderson, The 'Tyranny' of 911, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1990, at A22,
col. 1. For example, police in Gainesville, Florida discovered that it was far more likely
that convenience stores would be robbed when there was only one clerk on duty. After the
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This Article primarily focuses on another consequence of the
melding of civil and criminal remedies: the pressures brought to bear
on individual rights by the proliferation of civil supplements oper-
ating in tandem with the criminal law. Police and prosecutors have
embraced civil strategies not only because they expand the arsenal
of weapons available to reach antisocial behavior, but also because
officials believe that civil remedies offer speedy solutions that are
unencumbered by the rigorous constitutional protections associated
with criminal trials, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, trial
by jury, and appointment of counsel. A persistent question remains
regarding the use of civil remedies to check antisocial behavior: what
constitutional limits constrain their use?
One difficulty in ascertaining the appropriate constitutional lim-
itations is determining whether a particular proceeding is criminal or
civil. Several protections of the Bill of Rights are expressly limited
to "any criminal case" or "all criminal prosecutions," or, con-
versely, are confined to "suits at common law" or civil cases.20 Other
provisions, though not expressly limited to criminal cases, have been
so interpreted by case law.21
Commentators have devoted considerable energy to this engag-
ing and nettlesome issue.2 They frequently recognize that it is ex-
tremely difficult to draw principled lines to distinguish between
criminal and civil cases. Moreover, attempting to fit all cases neatly
police persuaded the city council to pass legislation in 1987 requiring the employment of
two clerks during certain hours, the robbery rate dropped a reported 65%. H. GoLDsTarn,
PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 80-81 (1990). See Kilborn, Convenience Store Jobs: High Risks
Alone at Night, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1991, at 1, col. 2 (discussing the Florida example in
the context of the increasing incidence of robberies and violent crimes occurring in conven-
ience stores).
20. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, VI, VII.
21. See e.g., infra text accompanying note 248; note 238 infra.
22. See, e.g., Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil
Penalty Cases, 59 CoRNEL L. REv. 478 (1974); Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. Rv. 379 (1976); Note,
Civil RICO is a Misnomer: The-Need for Criminal Procedural Protections in Actions Under
18 U.S.C. § 1964, 100 HIv. L. REv. 1288 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Civil RICO is a
Misnomer]; Note, Forfeitures-Civil or Criminal?, 43 TEmp. L.Q. 191 (1970) (authored by
Robert E. Edwards).
This issue persistently surfaces in litigation. E.g., Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
553 So. 2d 537, 543 (Ala. 1989) (considering whether a suit, although nominally civil, must
be considered criminal in nature as to punitive damages, thereby entitling the defendant to
protection under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments); aff'd 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1046
(1991) (award of punitive damages did not violate due process rights).
23. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 22, at 382-85; Note, Enforcing Criminal Laws Through
Civil Proceedings: Section 1964 of The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §
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into one category or the other, though sometimes necessary and use-
ful, can cause a good deal of mischief. If "criminal case" is defined
too broadly, then the cumbersome baggage of criminal procedure will
be carried into a wide range of government and private lawsuits. If
it is defined too narrowly, then the values that underlie various con-
stitutional provisions will be sacrificed simply because they arise in
a proceeding denominated as civil. Perceiving this dilemma, the Su-
preme Court sometimes has struggled to unravel its doctrine from
the tangled embrace of the dichotomy. 24 For example, in deciding
what constitutes double punishment under the double jeopardy clause,
the Court recently declined to rest its decision on whether the pun-
ishments arose in a criminal or civil proceeding. It found that such
an approach was too "abstract" and not adequately responsive to
the "humane interests" safeguarded by the double jeopardy clause. 21
This Article examines the constitutional issues presented by the
criminal-civil "mix and match" phenomenon by offering and ap-
plying a workable test for distinguishing between civil and criminal
cases. At the same time, it aspires to confine the importance of that
distinction to a limited subset of constitutional problems. Part II
surveys the types of civil remedies now used both to complement and
to supplement the enforcement of the criminal laws. Part III explores
and criticizes various bases for distinguishing between civil and crim-
inal cases, and offers an alternative, narrow test that, with few ex-
ceptions, will follow the legislature's label.
More specifically, Part III explains why, in all but two kinds of
cases, the legislature's declaration must be the exclusive determinant
of whether a proceeding is civil or criminal. A legislative label ap-
proach is consistent with much of what the courts have done, and
it offers a workable, bright-line test. More fundamentally, it rec-
ognizes that criminal proceedings are more than just a means of pun-
ishing specific persons; they are officially designated ceremonies of
guilt adjudication. As such, they express society's ideology of in-
dividual free will and personal responsibility and serve as a reaffir-
mation of moral rules.
This Article explores and ultimately rejects other means of dis-
tinguishing between civil and criminal cases, such as comparing the
severity of the sanctions involved, assessing the degree of stigma as-
1964 (1970), 53 TEx. L. REV. 1055, 1063-65 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Enforcing Criminal
Laws Through Civil Proceedings].
24. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989); infra, text accompanying
notes 238-245.
25. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
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sociated with particular proceedings, or ascertaining whether a pro-
ceeding operates to punish. Not only are these approaches inconsistent
with precedent and almost impossible to implement in a predictable
or principled way, but they also fail to take into account society's
vital interest in criminal proceedings.
Part IV of this Article argues that, in any event, the criminal-
civil distinction should play only a limited role in preserving con-
stitutional liberties. I argue that, on the constitutional level, the dis-
tinction only matters where the issues involve the proper procedures
or burdens of proof to apply in a particular case. Thus, for example,
the sixth amendment's requirements of a trial by jury and appoint-
ment of counsel, and the fifth amendment's due process requirements
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption of inno-
cence, need only apply in criminal cases. Other constitutional pro-
visions, such as the protections against double jeopardy and excessive
fines, as well as freedom from self-incrimination, although tradi-
tionally limited to criminal cases, should not be so confined. Indeed,
one of the consequences of the recent extension of civil responses to
criminal behavior has been the nascent refashioning of constitutional
doctrine along these lines.26
Part V of this Article observes that, so long as we continue to
draw distinctions between civil and criminal cases, there are likely
to be unique constitutional harms caused by using both criminal and
civil proceedings as parallel means of checking antisocial behavior.
That is, if civil and criminal cases, however defined, follow different
rules of procedure, burdens of proof, and rules of discovery, the
mere prosecution of simultaneous civil and criminal actions may force
defendants to compromise constitutional protections in one forum
in order to preserve advantages in the other. For example, if a de-
fendant is forced to admit ownership of property in order to resist
its forfeiture in a civil proceeding, she may thereby waive her priv-
ilege of self-incrimination in a concurrent criminal action.
In Part VI, I show how the unfair and oppressive effects some-
times produced by certain proceedings, despite the fact that they are
constitutionally deemed civil, can be checked by a more vigorous
judicial application of due process norms. Just as the rise of the "new
property ' 27 in the 1960s and 1970s led to a recasting of due process
26. See infra text accompanying notes 268-275.
27. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). In 1964, Professor Charles
Reich, observing that an individual's freedom and security very much depends on her ability
to hold and possess property free from irrational or procedurally unfair government inter-
ference, noted that this freedom was being seriously eroded by government's manipulation
and an eclipse of older ideas; 28 so now, the rise of the "new pen-
alties" may trigger a more vigorous application of due process pro-
tections.
Finally, the Article concludes with a look at one particular civil
remedy, the use of civil protection orders in domestic violence cases.
Such orders, now widely available, are obtained in civil proceedings
but, like criminal law proscriptions, are enforced with arrest, pros-
ecution, and incarceration. By looking at the use of these orders, we
can see how a new understanding of the distinction between criminal
and civil cases, including an understanding of when the distinction
is and is not constitutionally relevant, permits a more systematic and
complete accounting of the constitutional dangers posed by hybrid
criminal-civil proceedings.
II. The Interplay of Civil and Criminal Remedies
A criminal justice system seeks to prevent crime, 29 but, failing
that, to find and punish offenders.30 While there always have been
a variety of means to pursue these objectives, the traditional criminal
justice response has been arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. For
a long time, the conscious and systematic blending of criminal and
civil remedies as part of a single law enforcement strategy has been
pursued primarily by regulatory agencies in fields such as antitrust,
securities trading, and customs control.
That generalization is, however, no longer true. Because of the
changing nature of crime, the proven inadequacy of conventional law
of the terms and conditions of dispensing its own largesse. Professor Reich was among the
first to recognize that, in the modern welfare administrative state, people are increasingly
dependent on all forms of government benefits, such as awards of money, services, contracts,
franchises, and licenses. Dependence on this "new property" makes individuals dependent
upon the government and subject to its control. In order to preserve the concept of property
as a cornerstone of freedom, he argued that it was imperative to recognize the "new
property" of government largesse as a form of entitlement subject to procedural and
substantive safeguards akin to those protecting conventional property.
28. For example, the Supreme Court's rejection of the right-privilege distinction per-
mitted the government to fire its employees, cancel contracts, or terminate benefits at its
sole discretion. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) ("[T]his Court now
has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit
is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege."'). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
Nevertheless, the right-privilege distinction retains some vitality. See Smolla, The Reemerg-
ence of the Right - Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too
Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69, 69-82 (1982).
29. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(e), at 10-11 (2d ed. 1986).
30. For a discussion of alternative theories of punishment, see id. § 1.5, at 22-29.
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enforcement methods, and the demonstrated success of laws like RICO
and the asset forfeiture rules for drug cases, criminal justice officials
are energetically pursuing multiple strategies to prevent and punish
criminal acts. The following section catalogs the ways that civil rem-
edies can be used to achieve criminal justice goals. And it shows that
these instances are not isolated, unrelated phenomena; rather, taken
together, they represent a new way of looking at criminal justice is-
sues.
A. How Civil Remedies Complement Criminal Law Objectives
The civil law is rich in remedies. It offers compensatory dam-
ages, punitive damages, restitution, specific performance, injunctive
relief, constructive trusts, abatement of nuisances, and forfeitures.
In the regulatory sphere, the government has adapted all of these
remedies as means of enforcing a wide range of rules and regulations.
In the criminal justice arena, the same adaptive process is underway.
There are three distinct ways to accomplish this adaptation. First,
civil remedies can be incorporated into a criminal proceeding. For-
feiture or restitution, for example, can be prescribed as part of a
criminal sentence. 31 Second, the civil remedy can be chosen as an
explicit alternative to criminal prosecution. A legislature may con-
sider certain antisocial behavior, such as motor vehicle driving of-
fenses, too petty to be criminal, and yet seek to deter or punish
infractions.12 Or a legislature may consider certain offenses, like ra-
cial harassment, too difficult to prove under the strict procedural
rules applicable to the criminally accused.33 It even may believe that
some harms, like spousal abuse, are better dealt with as mental health
or family law matters.3 4 Third, civil remedies may be used as sup-
plements to criminal sanctions. In this case, the government may seek
a civil remedy, a criminal penalty, or both. The same activity that
forms the basis for a criminal prosecution also serves as the basis
for a civil sanction. In other words, the civil remedy is linked directly
31. E.g., Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat.
1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a), (b) (1988)).
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 318.12 (West 1990) (decriminalizing minor motor
vehicle code violations).
33. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 399 Mass. 93, 100, 502 N.E.2d
1375, 1379 (1987). Compare MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 11H, IllI (West 1986)
(providing civil remedy for violation of civil rights but not requiring defendant's action to
be willful) with MAss. GEN. LAWS AiN. ch. 265, § 37 (West 1986) (providing criminal
penalties for civil rights violations and requiring defendant's action to be willful).
34. See, e.g., LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 2121-2139 (West 1982) (establishing
family violence centers and civil remedies for "domestic abuse").
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to the underlying criminal activity." What follows is a brief survey
of particular civil remedies and a description of how each is now used
to complement enforcement of the criminal law.
B. Varieties of Civil Remedies
(1) Restitution and Recompense
Persons injured by the criminal conduct of others may bring a
civil action for damages.36 In such actions, as in any other form of
civil action, the victim must initiate the suit and bear the costs and
burdens associated with maintaining and enforcing it. The legal sys-
tem has responded to the victim's plight by trying to lighten these
burdens.17 The federal government and most states permit courts to
require restitution by criminal defendants either as part of their sen-
tences or as a condition of probation. 8 Less formally, the fact that
a criminal has made restitution often figures in police and prose-
cutorial decisions to reduce charges or not to charge at all. 39
When restitution remedies are incorporated into the criminal jus-
tice system, an important question arises: must the amount of res-
titution be limited to the sum that is the basis of the conviction? State
courts and commentators have taken many approaches to this ques-
tion and have answered it differently. 40 But, whether or not limited
in total amount, restitution may take forms other than money dam-
ages. For example, courts may order restitutionary relief in the form
of a constructive trust on property fraudulently transferred, a ref-
35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300i, 300i-1 (1988) (authorizing civil penalties in addition
to criminal sanctions for tampering with or attempting to tamper with public water systems).
36. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS
§ 2, at 8 (5th ed. 1984).
37. Some states, for example, have adopted victim compensation statutes. See, e.g.,
CA.. Gov'T CODE §§ 13959-13966 (West 1980); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1985 &
Supp. 1989).
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a), (b) (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100(a)(2) (1990);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.3
(West 1982 & Supp. 1990). See generally Boldt, Restitution, Criminal Law, And the Ideology
of Individuality, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOOY 969, 969-77 (1986) (discussing various
theories of restitutionary liability that states have followed).
39. See Goldstein, supra note 17, at 531.
40. See Boldt, supra note 39, at 970-77; Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal
Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931, 945-46 (1984). Compare State v.
Selland, 54 Wash. App. 122, 123-24, 772 P.2d 534, 535 (1989) (restitution may exceed the
sum supporting conviction) with Wilson v. State, 452 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (restitution may not exceed damage caused by criminal conduct).
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ormation of instruments, or the reconveyance of property fraudu-
lently transferred. 41
A variety of statutes permit the government, like ordinary cit-
izens, to recover the damages and costs it incurs as a result of a crim-
inal act. The government may have "rough compensatory justice"
or "remedial recovery" for destruction of government property, 42
losses from fraud or theft of government property, 43 interest and
costs associated with collecting back taxes,4 or damages to public
interests such as to the environment. 45 Governmental recovery via
restitution, compensation, and remediation, 46 like that of an ordinary
citizen, can be effected through a separate lawsuit, or directly in-
corporated into the criminal justice system.
Sometimes the government's recovery, through compensation or
remediation, includes the criminal's gains received as a result of her
unlawful conduct. 47 The recovery of such profits and proceeds can
be viewed broadly as compensatory, even though there may not be
a specific victim beneficiary. The idea is more to deprive the wrong-
doer of her ill-gotten gains than it is to restore any particular person
to a status quo ante. In some cases, however, the pursuit of proceeds
may become so far removed from the underlying wrong that it no
longer retains its compensatory nature. 48 Rather it becomes a punitive
measure akin to a statutory penalty or fine.
41. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 1987) (constructive trust as
a form of restitutionary relief for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty); Aluminum Co. of
Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 78-79 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (reformation, broadly
conceived, as a form of restitution).
42. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988); see United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
43. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988).
44. 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (1988).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988).
46. In the regulatory sphere, the government sometimes seeks a party's cooperation in
remedying the particular harms she has caused-hence the term "remediation." The remedy
can be as varied as the harm itself, and it may operate as a kind of specific performance.
For example, the President may enter into consent decrees with a responsible party to clean
up toxic waste sites, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988), and the Securities and Exchange Commission
may require a corporation to issue a corrective statement to clarify earlier proxy solicitation
material found to be false or misleading, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990). See also Studebaker
Corp. v. Allied Products Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (court ordered
production of stockholder list, set new record date, new annual meeting date, and ordered
supervision of proxy materials when it could not grant preliminary injunction); Central
Foundry Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (SEC and an incumbent
board of directors entitled to injunction restraining exercise of proxies by insurgents during
proxy contest).
47. See Fried, supra note 4, at 375-80.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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(2) Statutory Fines and Penalties
There exists a variety of statutory regimes that prescribe or pro-
hibit certain conduct and impose monetary penalties or fines for viol-
ations. Examples include tax laws, environmental regulations,
securities trading statutes, and workplace safety rules.
Sometimes the fine or penalty under these laws takes the form
of a double or treble damage award. 49 In other cases, there may be
a fine for each day of violation or simply a flat fee for each in-
fraction.50 Sometimes a private citizen, can initiate and litigate the
penalty action against the offender,' though the government ulti-
mately enforces the penalty.
Civil fines or monetary penalties are used frequently as alter-
natives to criminal prosecution. If, for example, a legislature decides
to decriminalize certain conduct, such as possession of small amounts
of marijuana, 52 it may, nevertheless, maintain some punishment to
deter such behavior. A schedule of money penalties may seem more
appropriate than a misdemeanor prosecution. Or, the regulated con-
duct may never have been deemed criminal but always have been
considered sufficiently undesirable to warrant some form of deter-
rence. The common system of motor vehicle parking citations and
fines presents a good example. 3
Sometimes the proscribed activity, such as nonpayment of taxes,
insider trading, or restraint of trade, is subject to both civil and crim-
inal sanctions. In such cases the civil regime directly supplements the
criminal law, and an offender faces two separate systems of sanc-
tions.5 4 The linkage between civil and criminal law may be so direct
49. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988) (treble damages for fraudulent claims for payment
submitted to the United States).
50. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1988) (per violation penalty for willful or repeated
OSHA violations) with 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1988) (per diem penalty for failure to correct
OSHA violations).
51. The legislature can enlist a citizen's aid by making her an agent for the recovery
of monetary sanctions, e.g., 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3731 (1988) (qui tam); or it may enlist
citizen enforcers by creating new causes of action. Congress has created various "citizen
suits" whereby new legal interests are recognized and private citizens are permitted to protect
these interests by bringing lawsuits for damages and injunctive relief. The citizen sues to
redress a wrong committed against her and, at the same time, she enforces rules and
regulations benefitting the public. See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988).
52. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)(f) (1987) (fine for possession of less than
one ounce of marijuana).
53. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1945 (1990).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (criminal penalties for restraint of trade); 15 U.S.C. § 15
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that recovery under the civil law is made dependent upon the plaintiff
proving that the defendant committed the criminal act with criminal
intent. In a civil RICO suit, for example, a private person may re-
cover treble damages for harms caused by a pattern of racketeering,
but only if she can show that the defendant committed certain "pred-
icate" crimes such as murder, arson, or fraud.55
Although civil fines and other equivalent monetary penalties-
much like liquidated damages-can operate as a form of restitution
or recompense, many are meant to punish. They operate as a kind
of punitive damages exacted for society's benefit.
(3) Loss of Government Benefits and Privileges
In our modern administrative state the government controls val-
uable opportunities through its power to confer benefits, employ-
ment, and licenses.5 6 Ordinarily, the loss of government benefits is
not incorporated directly into a criminal proceeding as part of the
defendant's sentence. Rather, the loss occurs collaterally. A recipient
can lose a benefit or privilege automatically upon conviction of a
crime.5 7 A conviction also can be used as evidence of lack of "good
moral character" or "unfitness" in a later disbarment, license rev-
ocation, or disqualification proceeding.58 For example, three airline
pilots recently were convicted under a new federal law that makes
it a crime to fly a jetliner while under the influence of alcohol.5 9 The
convictions followed the pilots' dismissal by the airline and the sus-
pension of their licenses by the Federal Aviation Administration. 60
There is almost no limit to the creativity of Congress in thinking
of ways to sanction participants in government-regulated activities.
Consider, for instance, recently proposed amendments to the Federal
(1988) (treble damages for violation of antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) and 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990) (criminalizing insider trading); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-l(a) (1)-(3), 78t-
1 (1988) (civil penalty for insider trading); 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (1988) (assessment for
nonpayment of tax); 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1988) (criminal penalty for nonpayment of tax).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
56. Reich, supra note 27, at 746. This may mean investigating an applicant's qualifi-
cations, conditioning receipt of a benefit on the performance of or compliance with certain
conditions, or suspending a licensee for some transgression.
57. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (1988) (prohibiting award of federal contracts to
convicted violators of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (1988)
(prohibiting award of federal contracts to persons convicted of Clean Air Act violations).
58. E.g., 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a) (1989) (conviction of certain crimes as cause for
debarment of government contractors).
59. Weiner, Northwest Pilots are Found Guilty of Drunken Flying, N.Y. Times, Aug.
21, 1990, at At, col. 3.
60. Id.
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 61 The proposals provide for debar-
ment, civil monetary penalties, and suspension of drug approvals for
fraud or corruption occurring in connection with applications to the
Food and Drug Administration. 62
Regulatory sanctions can and often do operate wholly outside
of the criminal law. Nevertheless, regulatory enforcement can com-
plement criminal law enforcement in two ways. First, in those areas
where antisocial behavior violates both regulatory and criminal law
norms, the regulatory sanction can provide an alternative to pros-
ecution, such as where prosecution seems too expensive or presents
insurmountable proof problems. Second, even if the government
prosecutes, it also may seek regulatory sanctions to remove a criminal
offender (and perhaps her associates and her business) from the reg-
ulated industry.63
(4) Forfeitures
The most popular "new" remedy for law enforcement officials
is the very old remedy of forfeiture. Federal and state authorities
have seized houses, boats, cars, apartment leaseholds, 64 guns, and
61. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988).
62. Emergency Food and Drug Enforcement Act of 1990, H.R. 4810, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990); Food, Drug, and Device Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1990, S. 2683,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
63. Persons with criminal records are barred from certain occupations or organizations.
See, e.g., DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (no bill of attainder problems with
§ 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act of 1953 which disqualified any person
who had been convicted of a felony from serving in a waterfront organization).
64. One particularly controversial leasehold forfeiture program is the federal govern-
ment's Public Housing Asset Forfeiture Demonstration Project. The program, initiated in
1990, targets housing projects in 23 cities around the country. Its statutory basis is 21
U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (1988), as amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). The law permits forfeiture of any leasehold interest that is used
or intended to be used to violate federal drug laws. It specifically permits public housing
authorities to evict tenants if they, members of their families, or even their guests engage
in drug-related criminal activities.
In Richmond, Virginia, groups representing public housing tenants brought suit in United
States district court, alleging that the federal government was planning to evict entire families
without any prior notice or opportunity to be heard. The evictions were to be based only
on an ex parte showing before a federal magistrate of probable cause to believe that a
member of the household was using a housing unit to sell drugs. Family members would
be left with only the opportunity, after eviction, to prove that they did not know about, or
did everything they could to stop, the criminal conduct. Although the federal statute
contemplates this exact procedure, the court enjoined the government from carrying out the
program in Richmond without affording prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Richmond Tenants Org. v. Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 607, 610 (E.D. Va. 1990). Accord United
States v. The Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., Apt. I-C, Brooklyn, New York, 760
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
July 1991] CIVIL REMEDIES AND CRIMINAL LAW OBJECTIVES
even entire businesses, under laws that permit forfeiture of property
that is used for or derived from criminal activity.
Currently, the prominent targets for forfeiture are assets used
by those who engage in drug trafficking and narcotics use. 65 But the
breadth of state and federal forfeiture statutes permits the seizure
of property acquired in violation of antitrust laws, 66 property used
for illegal gambling,67 vehicles used in violation of liquor laws, 68 guns
or other equipment used unlawfully in national parks,6 9 and property
smuggled in violation of customs laws. 70 Many states have gener-
alized forfeiture statutes that permit the seizure of virtually any prop-
erty used as an instrumentality of a crime. 71
Since forfeiture is the "divestiture without compensation of
property used in a manner contrary to the laws of the sovereign," '7 2
property can be forfeited even if the underlying activity is not defined
by law as criminal. Examples of this type of activity include selling
adulterated food 73 and importing banned products from disfavored
F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
Since Kemp, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has developed criteria
that go beyond what federal law requires for proceeding against particular tenants. These
include requiring: that the drug offender be the leaseholder of the property; that compelling
evidence be developed that the violator has participated in at least two felony drug offenses;
that the property be "an open and notorious site of drug distribution," and that efforts be
made to help and relocate the elderly and minors who may be affected by eviction. DEP'T
oF HousIN AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND DEP'T OF JUsTicE, FoRFEiTuRE OF LEASES FOR
DRuG FREE NEIGHaoRHOODS 3 (1990). The federal program is based on similar programs
established by state and local agencies in New York, Chicago, and Bridgeport, Connecticut.
Id. at 2. The federal government claims these programs are successful in ridding public
housing of drug dealers. Id. Nevertheless, affected tenants continue to argue that the means
chosen unduly and unfairly harm innocent and often helpless third parties. See Leasehold
Interest, 760 F. Supp. at 1032-33.
65. Chapman, A Weapon in the Drug War and its Innocent Casualties, Chicago Tribune,
Apr. 18, 1991, at C27, col. 1.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1988).
67. E:g., 15 U.S.C. § 1177 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1988). The Eighth Circuit
recently held that the Organized Crime Control Act authorizes the seizure not only of
gambling paraphernalia and other personal property, but also extends to seizure of real
estate, including personal residences, that are connected to gambling operations. United
States v. South Half of Lot 7 and Lot 8, 910 F.2d 488, 489-91 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
The Second Circuit has reached a similar result. See United States v. Premises and Real
Property at 614 Portland Ave., 846 F.2d 166, 167 (2d Cir. 1988).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3615 (1988).
69. 16 U.S.C. §§ 65, 117(d), 128, 171 (1988).
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1453 (1988).
71. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 5320 (West Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2c:64-1
to 2c:64-9 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1310 (McKinney Supp.
1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.075 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
72. United States v. Eight (8) Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1
(C.D. Cal. 1978).
73. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26583 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-29-15 (1973).
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countries. 74 Thus, forfeiture can be used as an alternative to the crim-
inal justice system; indeed, forfeitures are a pervasive mode of reg-
ulatory enforcement. 71
Under both state and federal law, property may be forfeited ei-
ther as a punishment imposed in a criminal proceeding (criminal for-
feiture), or as part of a separate civil proceeding (civil forfeiture).
There are important differences between these two types of forfei-
ture.
Criminal forfeitures are in personam proceedings instituted as
part of the criminal case against a defendant. The forfeiture affects
only the interests of the defendant in the property. Because criminal
forfeiture is a part of the criminal process, all of the rights defen-
dants enjoy in criminal cases, such as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, attend the proceeding. 76 Generally, the property may not be
seized until the defendant has been found guilty of the offense and
there is a finding of forfeiture by the trier of fact.
A civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. It is an action brought
against the property, not against any particular person having an
interest in the property. Historically, the proceeding was justified by
the legal fiction that the property itself was guilty of wrongdoing. 77
In a civil forfeiture action, the government seizes property, often
summarily, and persons with an interest in the property must sue to
recover it.78 In order to do so, they may either prove that the property
is not subject to forfeiture, or show that, although subject to for-
feiture, the property should be returned to the owner because she had
no knowledge of its illicit use. 79
74. See 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1988).
75. Fried, supra note 4, at 381.
76. There are, however, proceedings incident to criminal forfeitures which are not
subject to the usual burdens of proof and other protections surrounding trials of the
criminally accused. These proceedings are the means to preserve property which then may
be subject to forfeiture as part of the defendant's sentence. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(2)
(Supp. III 1985); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1985). A temporary restraining order,
for example, may be entered on a showing of "probable cause to believe that the property
... would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2)
(Supp. III 1985).
77. United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971)
("Traditionally forfeiture actions have proceeded upon the fiction that inanimate objects
themselves can be guilty of wrongdoing."); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S.
395, 399-401 (1877); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
78. The U.S. Customs laws, for example, outline a detailed process for seizure, forfei-
ture, and recovery of seized goods. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1615 (1988).
79. For a more detailed description of how forfeitures work, see U.S.D.J. NUTSHELL,
supra note 14, at 1-3; see also Fried, supra note 4, at 329-57; infra notes 416 and
accompanying text.
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Forfeiture can be divided into three separate categories based on
the kind of property seized and the rationale for seizing it. First,
there is "contraband": anything prohibited by law from being im-
ported, exported, or even possessed. Forfeiture is allowed because
the property itself is "guilty," being a prohibited article in which
there may be no traffic. The customs and import laws, for example,
are enforced by summary forfeiture both of contraband and of any
vehicle in which contraband is transported. 0 Just about anything can
be contraband if the legislature so designates it. Some examples are:
adulterated and misbranded products,81 narcotics,82 counterfeit
money, 83 firearms,8 4 and cars with falsified identification numbers.8 5
Second, there are "instrumentalities": any property used to pro-
duce, store, or transport contraband. This category also includes "any
property intended for use in violating the provisions of the internal
revenue laws." 86 The definition of instrumentality has been expanded
considerably in recent years. Originally intended to reach property
that actually was used to commit a crime, it now includes any prop-
erty having even the most tangential connection to criminal activity,
such as real property where a crime was planned. 87 Under this broad
definition, the government has gone so far as to seize leaseholds as
"instrumentalities." 8
Third, there are "proceeds" or "profits" derived from illegal
activity. This category includes the profits from a business fraud-
ulently obtained, as well as any enterprise or goods in which money
from criminal activities has been invested.89 The idea is to recover
the ill-gotten gains of criminal behavior and not permit the criminal
to profit from her misconduct. As has been the case with the def-
initions of "contraband" and "instrumentalities," however, the con-
cept of "profits" or "proceeds," especially in relation to enterprise
80. See 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1703 (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988);
49 U.S.C. §§ 781-784 (1988).
81. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1988).
82. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 781, 782 (1988).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. III 1985).
86. 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1989) (emphasis added).
87. See Fried, supra note 4, at 382.
88. See United States v. Various Parcels of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 62, 63 (N.D.
Ind. 1986); see also United States v. South Half of Lot 7 and Lot 8, 876 F.2d 1362, aff'd
on rehearing, 910 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (finding that real property is forfeitable
under 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1988) which permits the government to gain forfeiture of
property used in illegal gambling operations).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
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forfeiture, has been stretched far beyond its original boundaries so
that the value of profits or proceeds may exceed the criminal's ill-
gotten gains. 90 For example, an entire business enterprise can be for-
feited if the defendant has committed crimes in his management or
conduct of it.91
Civil forfeiture is quick, easy to use, and expansive in scope. It
is also highly lucrative. In 1988, for example, Broward County, Flor-
ida seized property valued at almost four million dollars. 92 About one
fourth of that total was kept by county law enforcement agents for
use in their departments. 93 Florida, like many other jurisdictions,
permits law enforcement agencies to benefit directly from aggressive
forfeiture efforts. 94 These features have made civil forfeiture enor-
mously attractive to law enforcement personnel. However, the harsh
effects of forfeiture, particularly on innocent persons, have drawn
increasing attention and critical review. 95
(5) Injunctions and Civil Protection Orders
Despite the seeming variety, many of the recent innovations in
using civil proceedings to address criminal or antisocial behavior ac-
tually draw upon an ancient and familiar remedy: the injunction. An
injunction is a court order that directs a particular defendant to do
or to refrain from doing specific acts. 96 The order is enforced through
a contempt proceeding. 97 Injunctions take many forms, including:
civil protection orders used to protect persons from domestic vio-
lence; orders to abate nuisances caused by maintaining premises where
illegal activity, such as drug dealing, has occurred; and orders to
cease gang activity or interference with another's civil rights. Indeed,
many of the "new" law-enforcement schemes are simply modern-
adaptations of statutes which have been on the books for decades.
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2)(A), (D) (Supp. I1 1985); see also United States v. Busher,
817 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (RICO conviction for subcontracting government contract
work to defendant's own fictitious corporation in another state; court ordered forfeiture of
both businesses).
92. Strasser, Forfeiture Isn't Only for Drug Kingpins, The Nat'l. L.J., July 17, 1989,
at 1, col. 1.
93. Id.
94. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 210.12, 849.44 (1989) (providing that forfeiture proceeds
go into the general operating fund).
95. See, e.g., Schmidt, Chicago's Housing Raids Challenge, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1988
§ 1, at 8, col. 1; Strasser, supra note 92, at col. 1.
96. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES: DAMAoES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 105 (1973).
97. Id.
1342 [Vol. 42
July 1991] CIVIL REMEDIES AND CRIMINAL LAW OBJECTIVES 1343
Injunctive relief also has been incorporated into criminal pro-
ceedings in the form of conditions imposed before a confined person
will be released. Judges long have used the imposition of conditions
to qualify a criminal defendant's release pending trial and as part
of a criminal defendant's sentence of probation.98 Defendants, on
pain of losing their freedom, sometimes are required to undergo drug
tests, stay at home after dark, get a job, make restitution to the vic-
tim of the crime, or perform community service. 99
Increasingly, injunctive relief is being used as an alternative or
as a supplement to criminal prosecution. For example, some states
have enacted statutes that permit abused spouses to seek a court or-
der enjoining further mistreatment. 100 Sometimes an injunction can
be sought for activity that alone is not criminal, in which case the
regime operates as a remedy apart from the criminal law. 10' Some-
times an order may be sought even though the conduct on which it
is based constitutes a crime, such as simple or aggravated assault. 0 2
In such circumstances, the injunction operates as a supplement to
the criminal statutes.
(6) Detention and Civil Commitment
Although we ordinarily associate the loss of physical liberty,
through confinement, detention, or jailing with criminal sanctions,
such deprivations also may be permitted in what the United States
Supreme Court has called "regulatory" contexts. 0 3 The Court has
approved such regulatory measures as pretrial detention, °4 detention
98. See Buhler v. Pescor, 63 F. Supp. 632, 638 (W.D. Mo. 1945); State v. Stallings,
234 N.C. 265, 66 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1951); Langford v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 155, 296
S.W.2d 929 (1956); Fox v. State, 347 S.E.2d 197, 203 (W. Va. 1986).
99. See Isaacs v. State, 373 So. 2d 911, 912 (Fla. 1979) (trial judge has discretion to
order drug testing as a condition of probation); 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3), (5), (13) (1988)
(authorizing restitution, employment, and community service as discretionary conditions of
probation); 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(20) (1988) (authorizing discretionary probation condition
requiring a defendant to remain at home during nonworking hours).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 422-433.
101. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ArNN. tit. 5, § 4655 (1989) (providing for issuance of a
protective order upon a finding of harassment); WAsH. REv. CODE § 10.14.080 (1990)
(allowing for anti-harassment civil protection orders).
102. See Hunt v. Hudgins, 168 S.W.2d 703, 703 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943); Hawks v. Yancey,
265 S.W. 233, 237 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924).
103. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
104. Id. (upholding the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988), which
requires the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with certain serious felonies if the
government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that no release condition can
"reasonably assure" the community's safety).
during wartime and insurrection, 5 detention of resident aliens pend-
ing deportation proceedings,' °6 post-arrest detention of juveniles, 0 7
detention of criminal defendants who are incompetent to stand trial, 1 s
and the involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons who are a
danger to themselves or to others.'09 Although most of these types
of confinement last for a relatively short period of time, some, such
as the confinement of the mentally ill, can turn out to be life sen-
tences."10
The linkage between the involuntary commitment of a person
who is mentally ill and the criminal justice system often can be quite
close. Some statutes recognize the commission of a criminal act as
a predicate for commitment and have even been interpreted to permit
committed individuals to be housed in the state penitentiary.", In-
voluntary civil commitment can be used to confine and treat a person
who is not competent to stand trial or is found not guilty by reason
of insanity." 2 More generally, commitment of the dangerously men-
tally ill may be the only means of protecting society when proving
a criminal case is impossible.
105. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (approving unreviewable executive
power to detain enemy aliens in time of war); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909)
(rejecting due process claim of individual jailed without probable cause by Governor during
time of insurrection).
106. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42 (1952); Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228, 236-37 (1896).
107. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1984).
108. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972); Greenwood v. United States, 350
U.S. 366, 375-76 (1956).
109. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-33 (1979).
110. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) (the Constitution permits the
government to commit persons to mental institutions even though they have been acquitted
of a crime by reason of insanity). Involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill has
declined over the past several decades due, in part, to constitutional procedural restrictions
adopted by the Supreme Court. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state
cannot confine non-dangerous individual who will only receive custodial care); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (commitment of a criminal defendant solely due to
incapacity to stand trial may violate due process); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (suggesting that punishment of certain status offenses, such as drug addiction and
mental illness, would constitute cruel and unusual punishment if treatment is not provided).
See also Bagby, The Effects of Legislative Reform on Civil Commitment Rates: A Critical
Analysis, 6 BEHAv. ScI. & L. 45 (1988); Durham & La Fond, A Search for the Missing
Premise of Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill,
40 RUTGERS L. Rpv. 303, 306-10 (1988).
111. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1980); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 51.20 (West 1987); see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (defendant declared
a "sexually dangerous person" after committing crimes of unlawful restraint and deviate
sexual assault).
112. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-16-41 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.15 (1985); see Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 356-57 (1983); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 720-22 (1972).
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C. The Appeal of Civil Remedies
There are many reasons why legislators and other governmental
officials are embracing greater use of civil remedies to respond to
criminal or antisocial behavior. Civil remedies can increase the degree
of punishment inflicted on a wrongdoer. If the offender faces both
a civil and a criminal sanction, the double liability may satisfy a per-
ceived need for greater retribution or enhanced deterrence. In some
instances, however, double punishments may not be constitutionally
permissible.1 3 In that event, a legislature need not rely on parallel
civil proceedings to increase punishment. It can simply prescribe a
harsher criminal sanction.
The wider use of civil remedies also may increase the incidence
of punishment by increasing the likelihood that offenders will be pur-
sued. In general, civil remedies are easier to use, more efficient, and
less costly than criminal prosecutions. When authorities can act with
a greater potential for success and with less expense and use of re-
sources, there is greater likelihood that they will act." 4 The theory
here may be that half a loaf really is better than none. That is, al-
though an offender may not face the full force of the criminal law
because a prosecution is too costly or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
cannot be proved, she will still be held accountable in some fashion.
If due process and other constitutional guarantees are refash-
ioned or simply applied more rigorously to civil proceedings, the ben-
efits of greater efficacy and efficiency may be somewhat diminished.
And if the government elects to pursue both a criminal and a civil
action against an offender, the civil proceeding actually may prove
to be inefficient. There is evidence, for example, that Congress ex-
panded the use of criminal forfeiture in drug cases to include prop-
erty of the defendant "used, or intended to be used, in any manner
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such
violation ' " 5 precisely because it would be more convenient to avoid
holding both a criminal trial and a civil forfeiture proceeding. 16
Furthermore, certain civil remedies offer opportunities to re-
spond directly to politically active groups, including groups of vic-
113. See infra text accompanying notes 268-275.
114. This likelihood may be diminished, at least temporarily, by an enforcing authority's
unfamiliarity with a novel or untested civil remedy. Or, there may simply be-on the part
of police or prosecutors-an unwillingness to use alternatives to the criminal process because
such alternatives are viewed as the tools of regulators, not "crime fighters."
115. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (1988) (Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984).
116. S. RaP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 196, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmm-N. NEws 3182, 3379-80; S. REP. No. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982); see United
States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987); Fried, supra note 4, at 380-81.
1345
tims' rights of spousal abuse and racial harassment. The expanded
use of the restitution remedy, for example, is a direct response to
the victims' rights movement."17 Of course, civil remedies are not the
only way, and may not always be the best way, to provide relief or
demonstrate that special efforts are being made on a group's be-
half." 8 The criminal justice system can achieve these goals by creating
special offices or special prosecution priorities.
The special contributions of civil remedies would seem to lie else-
where. First, when civil remedies are used as an alternative to crim-
inal remedies, it is possible to reserve a special province for criminal
justice and the criminal sanction. Criminal law can focus on serious
transgressions and harms involving culpable conduct, not merely neg-
ligent or impaired action. Civil remedies are a means to impose strict
liability for offenses and to identify behavior as antisocial without
invoking the full procedural and moral artillery of a criminal case.
The idea is that, to maintain its moral force, the criminal law should
address only seriously antisocial behavior and only behavior involv-
ing persons who are responsible for their actions." 9
Second, when civil remedies are used as supplements to the crim-
inal process, they permit the government to take actions and enlist
citizen resources that are not generally available to the criminal jus-
tice system. In terms of action, remedies such as forfeitures, in-
junctive relief, and constructive trusts enable the government to reach
the systemic supports of criminal activity-the organizations and
businesses that underlie ongoing criminal enterprises. Law enforce-
ment personnel long have recognized that the arrest and prosecution
of individuals, even on a massive scale, is often not enough to end
political corruption, organized crime, or the operation of illicit bus-
inesses.120 Civil remedies, such as a constructive trust imposed on a
117. See Goldstein, The Victim and Prosecutorial Discretion: The Federal Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 226, 229-31 (1984).
118. For example, if the civil remedy is perceived as relegating the victim to a "lesser"
remedy, or being "put off" by authorities, victims' rights groups will not be satisfied.
119. See H. PACKER, supra note 3, at 62-70, 249-50.
120. For example, in various reports issued between 1984 and 1986, the President's
Commission on Organized Crime repeatedly emphasized that criminal law enforcement-no
matter how energetically pursued-was inadequate to ferret out the influence of organized
crime and corruption in the American economy. In its extensive report on the influence of
organized crime over labor unions and businesses, the Commission said:
Despite many major prosecutorial successes, the government's efforts to remove
organized crime's influence over unions and legitimate businesses have been largely
ineffective.
To be successful, an attack on organized crime in our mainstream economy
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corrupt union, offer flexible means of targeting the organizational
supports for crime. 12' In fact, some criminal activity only can be ad-
dressed through such systemic reform. 22
In terms of expanding available resources, civil remedies permit
the government to enlist and even conscript citizens to prosecute, sue,
and shun criminals. Under qui tam statutes, citizens essentially are
converted into bounty hunters and paid handsomely, out of the of-
fenders' pockets, to sue those who have defrauded the government.
With civil RICO, plaintiffs can reap multiple damage awards if they
prove that enterprises are engaged in a pattern of racketeering. 23
RICO plaintiffs thus vindicate the harm done to themselves, and at
the same time, they exact heavy financial penalties from transgres-
sors. Moreover, civil forfeiture makes citizens, on pain of losing their
property as an instrument or proceed of crime, monitor the behavior
of guests in their cars, family members in their homes, or anyone
who borrows or leases their property. 24
Similarly, since the proceeds of crime are subject to forfeiture
in the hands of innocent persons who have knowing business dealings
with criminals, business people such as lawyers, doctors, or landlords
cannot rely solely on the enforcement of federal criminal laws. Organized crime
has established economic cartels which eliminate marketplace competition by
maneuvering businesses and labor officials through a kind of ownership not
recognized by the law. The Commission believes that a strategy aimed at the
legitimate economic base of organized crime must build upon the recent successes
of law enforcement, and must be based upon intervention measures as broad-
based as the nature of the threat posed by organized crime. A strategy in this
area should also rely upon civil and regulatory measures tailored to the specific
problems confronted in labor and management racketeering ....
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME, BusINEss, AND LABOR UNIONS § 11 at 1-2 (1986).
121. See United States v. Local 560 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 337
(D.N.J. 1984) (civil RICO used to impose a trusteeship on a union found to have been
"captured" by organized crime).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587-93 (1981) (reviewing legislative
history of civil RICO statute); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP L. Q. 1009,
1014-21 (1980) (reviewing the problems presented by organized crime's infiltration of legit-
imate businesses).
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
124. One recent example of asset forfeiture, the March 1990 drug arrests and property
seizures at the University of Virginia, shows how forfeiture can affect the lives of ordinary
citizens. There, the local police department sent letters to all of the fraternities on campus,
months before the raid, warning that the police had information that drug activity was
taking place and that, if this information proved to be correct, the fraternity houses could
be subject to forfeiture. Ayres, No Regrets, Says Organizer of Drug Raid at Virginia, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 28, 1991, at A20, col. 3; Isikoff, Drug Raids Net Much Valuable Property,
The Washington Post, Apr. 1, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
must cease such dealings or run the risk that money earned in an
arm's length transaction may be forfeited under a "profits and pro-
ceeds" theory. 125 Citizens and businesses also act as monitors when
threatened with vicarious liability carrying regulatory penalties such
as loss of a license or debarment. Criminal sanctions, focused as they
are on culpable individuals, have neither the scope nor the flexibility
of civil remedies.
I1. The Criminal Law-Civil Law Distinction
A. Why It Matters
Arguably, a legal system need not distinguish between criminal
and civil cases at all. 126 It simply could establish a "law of wrongs"
with each transgression separately defined and carrying its own pen-
alty and method of enforcement. Under such a system, society might
rely on government officials, like police and prosecutors, to enforce
the law. Alternatively, it could permit private citizens, like victims
or their families, to bring an offender to justice. 127
Nevertheless, with the rise of the modern nation state, govern-
ments assumed the general duty of ensuring the public peace 2 and
the specific duty of prosecuting individual wrongdoers . 29 Thus was
born the idea of offenses against society: so-called "public wrongs."' 30
An offense may have had a specific victim, but what made it a crime
was the fact that it violated peace, order, and societal norms.'3 '
By the time the United States Constitution was adopted, the dis-
tinction between criminal law and civil law was well accepted. The
Bill of Rights clearly reflects this division: more than half its pro-
tections apply primarily to the criminally accused. The self incrim-
125. See Fried, supra note 4, at 350-51.
126. See, e.g., S. SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME, 3-12
(2d ed. 1970); Boldt, supra note 39, at 989.
127. Historically, private prosecutions were the norm. See, e.g., J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL
VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 8 (2d ed. 1890) ("Crimes in Early Anglo-Saxon
Law seem to have been regarded as private wrongs, revenged rather than punished by those
who were injured by them ....").
128. R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 13-16 (1st ed. 1938).
129. See Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution and Disposition of a Criminal
Case, 28 VAND. L. REv. 931, 932 (1975).
130. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An
Historical Perspective, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 70 (Friedman &
Scheiber eds. 1988).
131. Id. at 165.
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ination clause of the fifth amendment, for example, expressly applies
to "any criminal case.' 1 32 Similarly, the sixth amendment rights to
a speedy trial, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory
process, and assistance of counsel are available to the "accused" in
"all criminal prosecutions. 13 3 Other constitutional protections, such
as the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
while not explicitly limited to criminal cases, have been substantially
confined to that context by precedent. 3 4 Given these distinctions, an
important question arises: for constitutional purposes, how do we
distinguish between criminal and civil proceedings when both seek
to deter and punish antisocial behavior?
Commentators have labored mightily to equate various civil rem-
edies, including fines, forfeitures, and treble damage actions, with
criminal proceedings. 135 The importance of this issue is apparent: if
these efforts are successful, then the constitutional provisions or-
dinarily associated with criminal proceedings presumably will apply
to many civil proceedings.136 Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed
that "(t]he distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty
is of some constitutional import." 137 The issue has arisen in matters
as diverse as the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill,138 pu-
nitive damage awards in private lawsuits,'139 juvenile proceedings, 140
pretrial detention,14 1 statutory fines and penalties, 42 forfeiture of
property, 43 loss of citizenship,'" and deportation proceedings. 14
B. Some Approaches to Drawing the Criminal-Civil Distinction
In thinking about how to distinguish criminal and civil pro-
ceedings, several plausible and appealing approaches come to mind.
We might simply identify punishments that are distinctly associated
with the criminal law, such as fines or incarceration, and then label
132. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
133. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
134. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 428 (1978); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1914).
135. See, e.g., Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer, supra note 22, at 1298-1300.
136. Id. at 1301.
137. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
138. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69, 374 (1986).
139. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1038-40 (1991).
140. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
141. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987).
142. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
143. Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288, 291-92 (Alaska 1985).
144. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164 (1963).
145. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 722 (1893).
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as criminal any proceeding in which those punishments may be in-
flicted. Or we might focus on the condemnation or stigma associated
with conviction for a criminal offense, and label as criminal any pro-
ceeding which carries equivalent opprobrium. Finally, we might sim-
ply view the criminal law as primarily aimed at inflicting punishment
and the civil law as primarily aimed at facilitating regulation and
compensation, and divide proceedings according to which of these
aims they primarily serve. This section examines, but ultimately re-
jects these bases of distinction, principally because they fail to take
complete account of the societal stake in the process of guilt ad-
judication.
(1) Sanction Equivalencies in Criminal and Civil Cases
It is clear that certain proceedings, even though statutorily or
judicially labeled "civil," in reality exact punishments at least as se-
vere as those authorized by the criminal law. Arguably, such pro-
ceedings should be treated as criminal proceedings for the purposes
of constitutional safeguards since, in the end, the punishment in-
flicted on the defendant is the functional equivalent of a criminal
sanction. This idea is appealingly straightforward and, sometimes,
equitably compelling. If a contractor who has filed false claims against
the government can be assessed thousands of dollars in civil fines,
why should the proceeding be any different from a criminal pros-
ecution for the same misdeeds that carries the same monetary pen-
alty. 146
Some commentators have argued that criminal constitutional
safeguards should apply to all civil punishments which are not de
minimis or petty. 147 Yet, though the severity of a civil sanction may
be an important consideration in applying various constitutional
146. In the same vein, consider cases in which a property owner is subject to the
forfeiture of expensive possessions like her house, her car, or her yacht because others,
without her knowledge or consent, used the property to possess or transport small amounts
of marijuana. Should not the defendant in such a case enjoy the same constitutional
protections as she would in a parallel criminal case carrying far lesser penalties? See Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
147. See, e.g., Comment, The Concept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment:
A New Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. CHI. L. Rav. 290, 292 (1965)
(authored by George Fletcher) (arguing that constitutional criminal procedure protections
ought to be afforded "whenever a person is threatened with a grave sanction"); but see
Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases,
59 CORNELL L. REv. 478, 507-12 (1974) (arguing that the civil-criminal distinction should
be based on the purpose of a penalty, without regard to severity).
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safeguards, the Supreme Court has never adopted this approach. 148
This sanction equivalency approach has many serious flaws, not the
least of which is the longstanding acceptance of the civil label even
as applied to huge punitive damage awards and fabulous forfeitures.
Even if one were to confine the argument to only those sanctions that
involve losses of liberty equivalent to the quintessential criminal sanc-
tion of incarceration, it is clear that the courts consistently have treated
certain deprivations of physical liberty, such as imprisonment for
civil contempt and involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, as
civil in nature.149
But, mindful of Holmes's admonition that we should have better
reasons than just history to support our legal rules, 50 we also should
reject the sanction equivalency approach because of practical, com-
mon sense concerns. The criminal procedural protections set out in
the Constitution are extremely costly and time consuming. In fact,
they may add nothing to and even frustrate the goals of fairness,
accuracy, and truth-finding. One can view the Bill of Rights itself
as a balancing of interests between the costs of procedures and the
benefits they confer.15 ' Any decision to extend procedural protections
beyond those instances where they clearly apply requires a similar
calculation.
Moreover, if the Court were to follow an equivalency approach,
it would necessitate the development of an entirely new jurisprudence
in order to identify sanctions that count-those that are not petty
or de minimis. While this task would not be impossible-after all,
the Court has drawn a bright line separating petty from serious crim-
inal offenses with regard to the sixth amendment right to trial by
jury-it would be daunting.
148. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986) ("The question of whether a
particular proceeding is criminal for the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause is first
of all a question of statutory construction."); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1980) (civil-criminal distinction turns on congressional intent; once intent has been deter-
mined, further inquiry into whether the statutory scheme is so punitive as to negate such
intent would only occur where the court had "the clearest proof to establish the unconsti-
tutionality of a statute on such a ground").
149. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (civil commitment); United States
v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947) (distinguishing civil from
criminal contempt); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442-43 (1911)
(same).
150. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rv. 457, 469 (1896-97) ("It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV.").
151. See Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of
Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FoaDHim L. Rlv. 391, 445-47 (1984);
Schwartz, Justice, Expediency, and Beauty, 136 U. PA. L. Rzv. 141, 158 (1987).
(2) The Matter of Stigma
Often the basic objective of the criminal law is to deter and pun-
ish socially deviant or harmful behavior. In this there may be sub-
stantial overlap with many civil proceedings .152 One major difference
between the two is that the criminal justice system and the law of
criminal procedure constitute society's formal means of determining
and pronouncing guilt and innocence, right and wrong. One dis-
tinction between criminal and civil sanctions, then, lies in the crim-
inal law's "judgment of community condemnation" on a
transgressor.'53 For some commentators, therefore, the ultimate dif-
ference between civil and criminal proceedings is that a criminal con-
viction, unlike civil judgment, carries with it the stigma, or brand,
of societal condemnation.
Although the Supreme Court has expressed sympathy for this
idea, 54 there are difficulties with this proposition. Perhaps the most
serious is deciding what is meant by stigma. Stigma can mean con-
demnation or opprobrium, but some civil wrongs are condemned
more seriously than are many criminal lapses. For example, a neg-
ligent, but not criminal, discharge of deadly toxic wastes into the
environment may carry an extremely high measure of social stigma.
If stigma depends upon public reaction, then courts are neither well-
152. See infra notes 168-171 and accompanying text. One example of overlapping civil
and criminal proceedings is found in the federal civil rights laws. Conspiring to prevent an
individual from exercising her constitutional or federal rights is a crime punishable by fine
or imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988). An injured individual also has a cause of action
for damages for substantially the same conduct that 18 U.S.C. § 241 criminalizes. See 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (1988).
Federal statutes that regulate widespread behavior commonly incorporate a private cause
of action in the statute thus creating private attorney generals. Allowing private citizens to
sue for damages-sometimes double or triple damages or attorney fees-serves to deter the
undesirable conduct more effectively than if only government prosecutors pursued the
lawbreakers. The federal antitrust laws are the classic example of the private attorney general
concept. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987) (Clayton Act brings to bear the pressure of private attorney generals on a problem
for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate).
Punitive damages, imposed in many kinds of civil cases, serve the purposes of retribution
and deterrence with regard to civil wrongdoing. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111
S. Ct. 1032, 1044 (1991); Browning-Farris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 257
(1989).
153. Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958).
154. E.g., In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1967). But stigma has not been enough to
convert a proceeding from civil to criminal. See Note, Enforcing Criminal Laws Through
Civil Proceedings, supra note 23, at 1061-62 (concluding that, while "stigmatization is not
itself a criminal penalty that is protected by the fifth amendment, . . . it remains a factor
to be considered in determining whether the proceeding is civil or criminal").
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equipped nor especially competent to assess whether a defendant truly
is to be stigmatized.
Stigma sometimes is viewed relative to the severity of the pun-
ishment imposed in a particular proceeding. This approach is dif-
ferent from the punishment equivalencies theory. At the heart of this
approach is the idea that some punishments are so severe or infamous
that, even if they are imposed under a civil label, they represent so-
cietal condemnation and ostracism-branding the defendant a
wrongdoer. Punishments such as capital punishment, long-term in-
carceration, and, presumably, loss of citizenship would qualify under
this approach. 55 But consider long-term loss of liberty through in-
voluntary commitment, corporal punishment, or loss of the custody
of one's children: all of which the courts routinely have regarded as
civil in nature. What shall be the measure of severity in these cases?
Alternatively, stigma might be measured by the legislature's in-
tention. In fact, the cases indicate that the key factor used to separate
civil from criminal proceedings is the label affixed by the legisla-
ture. 5 6 If stigma is to be our benchmark, this is how it should be
determined. 57 The very act of labeling certain behavior as criminal
clearly reflects the community's moral judgment that it is deviant,
unacceptable, and, therefore, to be officially and publicly con-
demned. By affixing this label, society binds itself to the stringent
procedures applicable to criminal proceedings; it does so both to pro-
tect individual rights and to give its final judgment much more cer-
tainty, power, and finality. A person is branded as a criminal,
punished, and subjected to the collateral consequences of having the
status of "convicted felon." This approach explains outcomes that
have intuitive appeal: civil fines of even large sums do not denote
the commission of crime; but a criminal conviction, even with the
sentence completely suspended and no fine imposed, obviously does.
The legislative label approach thus has a good deal to recom-
mend it: acceptance by the courts, intuitive appeal, and it offers a
bright line test and, thus, an easily applied solution to the civil law-
criminal law conundrum. There are, however, two significant failings
in exclusive reliance on legislative labeling. One is that if we allow
the legislature's label to be conclusive regarding the nature of a pro-
ceeding, such a formalistic approach might easily lead to legislative
abuse. The legislature presumably could label the crime of bank rob-
bery as a civil offense, provide for "civil" imprisonment and fines,
155. See infra notes 208 and accompanying text.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 177-180.
157. Id.
and thereby sidestep Bill of Rights protections for the criminally ac-
cused. A second and closely related problem is that no matter how
severe or infamous the punishment, no proceeding clearly and pur-
posefully labeled as civil would be considered as criminal for the
purposes of constitutional protections. As this Article will demon-
strate, a fuller understanding of why the legislative designation is so
central to classifying a proceeding as criminal-an understanding
which transcends the matter of stigma-will provide a response to
these two objections.
(3) A Legislative Purpose to Punish
Commentators have suggested another approach to the criminal-
civil distinction, one that focuses on how the goals of the criminal
process are distinct from those of the civil process. If we know the
answer to this question, it is thought, we can then look at a pro-
ceeding, ask whether it serves criminal law or civil law purposes and
apply constitutional protections accordingly.5 8 This approach relies
on the fact that different proceedings often are driven by different
legislative purposes.
All criminal and civil proceedings are designed to serve certain
underlying goals. Sometimes the objectives are multiple, sometimes
they are unclear, but the major goals can be discerned. And, al-
though criminal and civil cases tend to have different emphases, they
can and do serve many of the same objectives, including compen-
sation, deterrence, rehabilitation, treatment and protection, coercion
to perform specific acts, and retribution.
At one end of the spectrum, civil and criminal cases most clearly
diverge when the objective is recompense of the injured, which is the
hallmark of a civil proceeding. Although a criminal sentence may
include restitution'59 and the criminal process can impose restitution
as a condition of probation, 160 criminal procedure is not designed
primarily to aid the victim of a crime. 161 Indeed, there is a growing
158. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 22, at 382-85.
159. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3556, 3663, 3664 (1988).
160. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1988) (Federal Probation Act).
161. Indeed, one commentator argues that it should not be so designed. Boldt, supra
note 38, at 1014-16. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between recompense as
restitution to the person harmed on the one hand, and penalties exacted by and paid to the
government on the other. The criminal law may separate a criminal from her unjust gains,
but its primary purpose is not to aid the crime victim. In fact, criminal forfeiture may
actually frustrate the goal of victim recompense by depleting the assets a criminal has
available for civil restitution.
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literature decrying the fact that the victim of crime is a forgotten
person in the criminal process. 162
At the other end of the spectrum, the criminal and civil law most
clearly diverge when the goal is to exact a penalty capable of ex-
pressing condemnation-commonly termed retribution. Although
some civil sanctions, particularly punitive damages, can be partially
retributive in nature, criminal law alone has the retributive char-
acteristics associated with lengthy incarceration or execution.
In contrast to recompense and retribution, when it comes to de-
terrence, civil and- criminal remedies are essentially indistinguishable
and interchangeable. 6 3 The goal of deterrence is to prevent or dis-
courage individuals from engaging in certain undesirable conduct. It
requires a calculation of what punishment, given the likelihood of
being "caught," will suffice to make a person conform his conduct
to a certain norm. 64 Whatever the final calculation, the punishment
must amount to more than recompense or restitution.165 The theory
is that humans, as rational weighers of the risks and benefits of their
actions, will risk being penalized if the worst they face is having to
pay market value for their illicit gains.166
Finally, with respect to the goals of treatment and rehabilitation
of an individual, there is little intrinsically to distinguish between
162. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 117, at 245-46 ("A major tenet of the victims'
movement and the [Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982] is the belief that the victim
has been too much removed from the prosecution of the crime against him, that such
removal underlies the common failure of victims to report crime and to cooperate in its
prosecution.... ."); Lamborn, Toward a Victim Orientation ii Criminal Theory, 22 RtrrGERs
L. REv. 733 (1968); Schafer, The Proper Role of a Victim-Compensation System, 21 C.nm
& DELiNQ. 45 (1975); Note, But What About the Victim? The Forsaken Man in American
Criminal Law, 22 U. FiA. L. Rav. 1 (1969).
163. See R. PosNmR, EcoNolrnc ANALYSIS OF LAW 187, 190 (3d ed. 1986) (tort remedies,
as well as criminal sanctions, can be effective deterrents).
164. See, e.g., A. PoLinsKy, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONoincs 73-84 (1983).
165. Id.
166. Deterrence can vary in how directly it operates. Direct deterrence includes all forms
of incapacitation such as preventative detention or incarceration. This sometimes is called
"specific deterrence." See J. ANDENAES, PUNISMAENT AND DETERRENCE, 1765-81 (1974).
General deterrence, in contrast, includes the in terrorem effects of just announcing to all
the world the consequences that will follow discovery of proscribed conduct. The effect of
threat may be weak or strong, depending on the nature of the potential penalty (loss of a
job, money, or liberty are examples) and the likelihood that a person actually will be caught
and subjected to the penalty. Deterrence through threats can, of course, be made more
potent if a particular person is singled out, as in the case of an injunction, and told to do
or not do an act or face the consequences. Finally, deterrence can be quite indirect, as when
those who aid the wrongdoer or fail to prevent the undesirable conduct are penalized. This
is one theory behind the forfeiture of property such as cars, leaseholds, and houses of
innocent persons who have permitted, or did not prevent, the use of their property in an
illegal or wrongful transaction.
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criminal and civil remedies. Historically, the institutionalization of
the mentally ill, 167 juvenile court proceedings, protective custody, and
actions establishing or withdrawing custody of a child, have been
thought to serve these goals. But the criminal process also can ad-
vance non-retributive aims. Indeed, until recently many thought that
rehabilitation and treatment were the primary objectives of criminal
sanctions.1 68
In order to distinguish between criminal and civil cases, it has
been argued that if a proceeding, regardless of its label, aims at pun-
ishment, then it should be deemed to be at least presumptively crim-
inal. 169 Punishment, however, generally is defined as a penalty or
burden imposed as a result of an offense against legal rules, usually
for the purpose of rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, or ret-
ribution.1 70 Under this definition, which generally is accepted by courts
and commentators, it is impossible to distinguish criminal and civil
cases according to whether or not they involve punishment. Both civil
and criminal cases "punish."
Indeed, punishment is a common objective of many civil pro-
ceedings. We operate in an administrative, regulatory state that de-
pends upon comprehensive and complex systems of rewards and
penalties. Therefore, any approach that classifies as criminal all pro-
ceedings that punish could subject a vast array of actions to the in-
efficiency and expense of a criminal trial. Moreover, this approach
would require a revolutionary reworking of the law. This fact alone
is reason enough to reject it.
167. The Supreme Court, in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-37 n.19 (1972),
recognized that among the states' varying purposes for civil commitment, the protection of
the individual to be committed and the need of that individual for care or treatment are
the two most often stated reasons. In Jackson, the Court held that "due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed." Id. at 738. See also Comment, Involuntary Civil
Commitment of the Non-dangerous Mentally Ill: Substantive Limitations, 18 S.D. L. REv.
405, 415 (1973) (authored by Derald W. Wiehl) (asserting that the purpose of civil commit-
ment is generally to protect the individual, and citing South Dakota law that allows
commitment of an individual for her own protection).
168. E.g., Plattner, The Rehabilitation of Punishment, 44 PUBL. INTEREST 104 (1976)
("For over a century, American penology had subscribed to the rehabilitative ideal and its
practical concomitant, the indeterminate sentence, which tailors the length of a convict's
prison term to his prospects for and progress toward the cure of his criminal tendencies.").
169. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 22, at 404.
170. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965) ("It would be archaic to
limit the definition of 'punishment' to 'retribution.' Punishment serves several purposes:
retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent and preventative."); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONS1BILITY 4-5 (1968). Government's capacity to punish is thought to be distinct from
its efforts to treat illness, provide compensation, or administer regulatory programs. H.
PACKER, supra note 3, at 31.
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Punishment could be considered a term of art and its application
limited to only those sanctions imposed solely as retribution. Ret-
ribution would be defined to include any punishment imposed be-
yond the purposes of recompense, rehabilitation, or deterrence-a
penalty imposed solely to punish. This approach would limit the need
to extensively rework chunks of settled doctrine because few, if any,
civil proceedings serve solely retributive purposes. 171 But, by the same
token, few criminal proceedings serve solely retributive purposes.
The retribution approach would, in the end, identify so few pro-
ceedings as "criminal" that it would be analytically trivial.
(4) Putting It All Together
Even if sanction equivalence, stigma, and the intent to punish
are by themselves inadequate to mark a proceeding as criminal, might
not all three features, weighed together, be sufficient? There is cer-
tainily great force to this approach, since it comprehensively balances
complex and interactive factors. If this balancing test clearly indi-
cates that a proceeding is a criminal matter, the argument runs, we
should treat it accordingly. The Supreme Court has come close to
adopting this approach, but with a twist.
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,172 the Court struck down a
provision of the Nationality Act of 1940 that prescribed loss of cit-
izenship for any person who, to evade military service, lived or re-
mained outside of the United States during time of war. 173 The Court
reviewed the legislative and judicial history of the law and noted that
Congress employed forfeiture of citizenship as a punishment for be-
havior that had been identified as a crime in another legislative pro-
vision. The Court then held that the loss of citizenship is a criminal
punishment that may not be imposed without all of the safeguards
which attend criminal trials. 74 In making this determination, the Court
specifically identified seven factors that should be analyzed to assess
whether, for constitutional purposes, a punishment is criminal:
(1) Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
171. This is because the idea of deterrence is so encompassing that even grossly dispro-
portionate civil penalties can be justified as deterrents. Consider, for example, that a
community may want to deter double parking, and yet it does not want to commit any
significant resources to preventing it. It would be perfectly rational and consistent with the
objective of deterrence to impose even a one million dollar fine for the offense if the chances
of actually getting caught were minuscule. See A. PoLiNsKY, supra note 164, at 73-74.
172. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
173. Id. at 186.
174. Id. at 184-86.
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ment, (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment - retribution and deterrence, (5) whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, (6) whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned . .. . 1
Although this comparative factor test has been invoked repeat-
edly, 176 it is doubtful whether the Court is prepared to apply it se-
riously. The Court never actually relied upon it in Mendoza itself,
77
and there has been no subsequent case in which the factors have ever
added up to a finding that a proceeding was criminal for all con-
stitutional purposes. But perhaps more fundamentally, and here is
the twist, the Court in Mendoza made clear that it would shift to
the multi-factor or comparative approach only if there was real doubt
about whether the legislature intended a proceeding to be civil or
criminal.17 As the Court has stated repeatedly: "whether a particular
statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory
construction."1 79 Only if there is marked uncertainty over what the
legislature intended, or if the defendant provides "clear proof" that
"the statutory scheme [was] so punitive either in purpose or effect
as to negate [the State's] intention," will the court engage in the fac-
tor analysis.8 0
The Court has never provided a coherent account of why the
comparative analysis has been relegated to such a subordinate role.
Such an account, however, can be rendered and through it, a more
complete theory of what makes a proceeding distinctively criminal
can be posited. The Court correctly downplays the comparative anal-
ysis because even when relevant factors such as sanction, stigma, and
punitive intent are considered together they capture only part of what
criminal cases are all about. These factors are incomplete. All of the
175. Id. at 168-69 (citations omitted).
176. E.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242, 249-51 (1980).
177. See Mendoza, 372 U.S. at 169:
("Here, although we are convinced that application of these criteria to the face
of the statutes supports the conclusion that they are punitive, a detailed exami-
nation along such lines is unnecessary, because the objective manifestations of
congressional purpose indicate conclusively that the provisions in question can
only be interpreted as punitive.
(citations omitted).
178. Id.; see United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249-51 (1980) (illustrating this
approach).
179. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248; see Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986); One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
180. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986).
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prior "solutions" to the civil-criminal law distinction, including the
comparative factor analysis, are helpful yet ultimately flawed because
they focus primarily or exclusively on the effect of a proceeding on
the offender. Even where a legislature's purposes have been explored,
the exploration has been in terms of what the legislature meant to
do to the offender-punish, deter, or condemn.
Criminal cases, however, involve much more than punishing or
regulating a specific person's actions. The adjudication of guilt, as
a process, is a public restatement of societal boundaries and a public
reinforcement of the concept of individual responsibility. 81 Admit-
tedly, the criminal law does focus on the individual offender when
it seeks to punish and deter. Yet it also serves a broader and more
constructive function.1 82 Guilt adjudication is a ceremony through
which society expresses the ideology of individual free will and re-
sponsibility, reaffirms moral rules, and forges a social consensus.'83
The process of guilt adjudication is more than just the predicate for
imposing punishment; it is the very essence of a criminal proceeding.
The central importance of guilt adjudication as a social process
often is reflected in the reaction of the public to reported wrongdoing
by public officials or noted or wealthy citizens. The central desire
is to bring such a person to justice, no matter how high his station
or how great his wealth or power. Even where there is great sympathy
or admiration for the wrongdoer, the need to publicly call to account
is overriding.
Consider, for example, the case of Oliver North, who was charged
with a variety of offenses in connection with the Iran-Contra affair.
Many believed that he was -a fall guy, a true patriot, or a soldier who
just followed orders. There were, nevertheless, many who believed
that he should be criminally tried for his alleged wrong-doing. 18 4 This
was true even though there was also considerable sentiment that, if
found guilty, he should not be punished in any significant way.
181. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 3, at 69; Ball, A Theory of Punishment: Restricted
Reprobation and the Reparation of Social Reality, in STRUcTUaE, LAW, AND POWER: ESSAYS
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 135, 141-42 (1979); Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old
Bottles, in ASSESSING THE C mAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND Tm LEGAL PROCESS
231, 242-43 (1977).
182. See Boldt, supra note 38, at 1004-14.
183. Id.
184. This view appeared on the editorial pages of the country's newspapers at crucial
points during the Iran-Contra affair-when, for instance, there was talk of a Presidential
pardon for Mr. North. See, e.g., Talking Pardons, Unforgivably Early, N.Y. Times, Apr.
12, 1988, at A34, col. I (editorial); Kinsey, Pardon Them?, The Washington Post, July 23,
1987, at A21, col. 1.
Viewing criminal cases as ceremonies of guilt adjudication may
also explain the disappointment of some groups, such as women or
minorities, who consider vindication of harms against them through
the civil process as inadequate. When wife beating is not treated as
a crime, but instead as a matter for mediation or counseling, or when
racial assaults are administratively regulated instead of being crim-
inally prosecuted, society undoubtedly has readjusted its consensus
on the moral acceptability of these types of conduct. 185
The notion that criminal proceedings are special and different
because they serve as "affirmation[s] of shared moral purpose,' ' 86
adds force to the public's constitutional right to attend criminal
trials. 187 This idea buttresses the Court's conclusion that a defen-
dant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This stan-
dard, the Court has said, "is indispensable to command the respect
and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal
law.'1' 88
From this assessment, it follows that a matter can only be crim-
inal if formally intended to be and denominated as such: following
the form of a criminal trial and calling a person to account for action
clearly labeled as criminal by the legislature. Furthermore, a criminal
prosecution is marked by several distinctive characteristics: the gov-
ernment proceeds against a "defendant"; the defendant is formally
indicted; and the objective is to adjudicate guilt-to have the de-
fendant found "guilty" or declared "innocent." In other words, ex-
cept in two rare instances which will be discussed shortly, it is correct
to say that proceedings are criminal only if so labeled by the leg-
islature. Being so labeled, they must follow the procedures that not
only protect the defendant but also give weight and meaning to the
ceremonial aspect of guilt adjudication. There is, however, a cir-
cularity inherent in this equation: criminal cases trigger certain pro-
cedures, but the procedures themselves-trial by jury, guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, right to counsel-highlight the criminal nature
of the proceeding.8 9 In other words, the medium is the message.
185. In contrast, the federal government now relies more heavily on criminal penalties
to enforce environmental laws. This is partly a response to greater public condemnation of
polluting activities. See Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental
Crimes, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 821 (1990) (criticizing the current trend).
186. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1308 (1977).
187. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980).
188. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
189. See, e.g., R. PERKINS & R. BoycE, CRIMINAL LAW 12-13 (3d ed. 1982) ("A definition
of the term crime cannot practically be separated from the nature of proceedings used to
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Under this analysis, there are only two kinds of cases that can
be considered criminal, even though they are neither plainly labeled
as criminal nor fully prosecuted as such. First, there are those cases
that can be termed "shadow proceedings." These are cases in which
the adjudicative processes and final outcomes so nearly trace criminal
proceedings that there is little identifiable basis on which to distin-
guish them. They are characterized by a charge of a criminal act, a
prosecutioxi by the government, the condemnation and stigma as-
sociated with an adjudication of guilt, and the ultimate incarceration
of a convicted offender. These similarities to criminal proceedings
notwithstanding, in shadow proceedings, the government contends
that the offender holds some special status and states that its ob-
jective is not simply to punish but to rehabilitate or treat the in-
dividual. Usually the government seeks to withhold one particular
constitutional protection in these proceedings-for example, trial by
jury or the privilege against self-incrimination. The two classes of
persons affected by shadow proceedings are juveniles and the crim-
inally mentally ill.' 90
The Supreme Court has come very close to treating juvenile pro-
ceedings as criminal cases and applying to them all constitutional
protections associated with criminal trials. The Court has held that
a juvenile is entitled to notice of the charges against him, to be rep-
resented by counsel and to have counsel appointed if necessary, and
to confront witnesses.19' It also has held that proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is the applicable standard in juvenile proceedings. 192
In addition, the Court has recognized a juvenile's right to claim the
protection of the right against self-incrimination 93 and not to be twice
placed in jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. 94
In reaching these conclusions, the Court has looked at how ju-
venile delinquency proceedings actually function. It has found that,
despite the juvenile court system's good intentions, a juvenile pro-
determine criminal conduct."); Williams, The Definition of Crime, 8 CURRENT L. PROBS.
107, 123 (1955) (crime is "an act that is capable of being followed by criminal proceedings,
having [a criminal] outcome.").
190. For the purposes of this Article, "the criminally mental ill" refers to persons who
are unable to stand trial because of mental illness, persons who have been found not guilty
by reason of insanity or diminished capacity, and persons who are accused of committing
a crime but are subjected to an involuntary civil commitment proceeding rather than a
criminal prosecution.
191. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1967).
192. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
193. Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
194. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
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ceeding is "comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."'' 95
In this regard, the Court has noted that juvenile proceedings involve
potential "incarceration against one's will, whether it is called 'crim-
inal' or 'civil."" ' 96 It further has recognized that "in terms of po-
tential consequences, there is little to distinguish . . . [a juvenile]
adjudicatory hearing. . . from a traditional criminal prosecution."' ' 97
Nevertheless, a majority of the Court has balked at actually rul-
ing that a juvenile delinquency proceeding is a "criminal prosecu-
tion" under the sixth amendment. 98 It has refused specifically to
extend the sixth amendment right to trial by jury to juveniles.199
Rather, the Court has invoked the due process requirements of fun-
damental fairness to say that, as a matter of due process of law,
most, but not all, protections associated with criminal trials apply
to juveniles. 200
Individual justices have criticized the Court for not following
the logic of its earlier cases, and failing to require jury trials in ju-
venile cases. The logical implication, as Justice Harlan noted, is that
"juvenile delinquency proceedings have in practice actually become
in many, if not all, respects criminal trials. ' 20'
The Court has been even less sympathetic to seeing functional
equivalence between civil and criminal proceedings in cases involving
mentally ill individuals who pose a danger to the general citizenry.
This lack of sympathy was most evident in Allen v. Illinois20 2 where
a bare majority of the Court held that no privilege against self in-
crimination applied in the involuntary civil commitment of a person
deemed sexually dangerous. 20 3 The Court found that the defendant
failed to provide the "clearest proof" that he was treated in a way
incompatible with the state's asserted interest in treatment. 204 The
Court reached this conclusion despite the following facts: the de-
fendant had been deemed "sexually dangerous" in a proceeding that
was virtually identical to the state's prosecution of sex related crimes;
195. Winship, 397 U.S. at 366 (citation omitted).
196. Gault, 387 U.S. at 50.
197. Breed, 421 U.S. at 530.
198. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
199. Id. at 545.
200. Id. at 543-50.
201. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I do not see why, given Duncan [Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)] juveniles as well as adults would not be constitutionally
entitled to jury trials, so long as juvenile delinquency systems are not restructured to fit
their original purpose.").
202. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
203. Id. at 374-75.
204. Id. at 369.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
July 1991] CIVIL REMEDIES AND CRIMINAL LAW OBJECTIVES 1363
the prohibited conduct also was punishable under the criminal law;
and the defendant ultimately was committed to the guardianship of
the state's Director of Corrections.
Indeed, the facts of Allen offered such an ideal opportunity for
a finding of functional equivalence with criminal prosecution that
one can only conclude, yet again, that the Court remains content to
limit the multi-factor, totality of the circumstances analysis of Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez25 to its facts. In his dissent, Justice Stev-
ens emphasized that the Illinois "sexually dangerous person"
proceeding was "virtually identical to Illinois' proceeding for pros-
ecution of sex-related crimes." 20 As he explained:
[T]he Illinois "sexually dangerous person" proceeding may only be
triggered by a criminal incident; may only be initiated by the sov-
ereign State's prosecuting authorities; may only be established with
the burden of proof applicable to the criminal law; may only pro-
ceed if a criminal offense is established; and has the consequence
of incarceration in the State's prison system-in this case, Illinois'
maximum-security prison at Menard.20 7
In addition to shadow proceedings, the other category of cases
that may transcend the civil label is that in which the punishment
imposed so dramatically expresses societal disapproval that its im-
position only can be legitimated through the ceremony of a criminal
conviction. These punishments are those that actually separate a per-
son from civilized society and label her as not worthy of being a
member of the group. Included in this category of punishments are
execution, incarceration, and loss of citizenship, a kind of banish-
ment that represents the ultimate separation from society. 28
205. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
206. Allen, 478 U.S. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 379. Justice Stevens continued:
It seems quite clear to me, in view of the consequences of conviction and the
heavy reliance on the criminal justice system-for its definition of the prohibited
conduct, for the discretion of the prosecutor, for the standard of proof, and for
the Director of Corrections as custodian-that the proceeding must be considered
"criminal" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. In a footnote, Justice Stevens added the following:
The "sexually dangerous person" proceeding shares other characteristics with
criminal law as well. The statute requires that the individual "have the right to
demand a trial by jury and to be represented by counsel." Under the Illinois
Supreme Court's construction, moreover, an individual has the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses. Significantly, as with the latter set of requirements,
many of the criminal law procedures that have been found applicable to the
"sexually dangerous person" proceeding have been imposed by courts because of
the nature of the proceeding.
Id. at n.11 (citation omitted).
208. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (an immigration
In sum, the legislature decides which conduct is criminal and
which proceedings are criminal. The key is determining when the
legislature has so spoken. It can and usually will make an express
declaration. Its statement, however, also can be implied through a
clear course of conduct, such as shadow proceedings, or through the
imposition of a penalty that is consistent only with the view that the
underlying conduct punished was criminal, such as incarceration or
loss of citizenship. 20 9
It should be obvious that this definition of a criminal proceeding
will encompass few, if any, of the recent efforts to control antisocial
behavior through court orders, forfeitures, or monetary penalties. If
the legislature has neither labeled the proceeding criminal nor au-
thorized proceedings or punishments that are consistent only with
criminal cases, then the proceeding will remain civil in nature re-
gardless of how severe the penalty is, whether the defendant's con-
duct also may be prosecuted as a crime, and the degree of stigma
that attaches to violation of the statutory standard.
C. The Unique Problem of Contempt
When a court issues an order to a party to act or refrain from
acting, at times there is noncompliance. In such cases the court has
the inherent power, which often is codified in statutes, to hold the
disobedient party in contempt. 210 The court, through the imposition
of fines or incarceration, may punish the violation or the court may
act to coerce compliance. 21' The contemner is subject to a fine'and
officer's commitment of a deportable alien to one year's confinement at hard labor was a
sentence of imprisonment rendering the "civil" proceeding equivalent to a "criminal pros-
ecution" for fifth and sixth amendment purposes).
One commentator believes purely "criminal" punishments also would include "infamous"
punishments such as being put at hard labor or subjected to whippings or beatings. See
Clark, supra note 22, at 401-03. But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies only to criminal
convictions and thus does not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment applied by school
officials to students).
209. Of course, this is not to say that the legislature's declaration, no matter how
divined, will succeed. The legislature might declare that advocating communism is a crime
or that being a drug addict is a crime. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(overruling Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (conviction for membership in
Communist Party)); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (conviction for "status"
of being a narcotics addict overturned). In such instances, the legislative intent will be
frustrated by independent constitutional limits such as the first or fourteenth amendments.
While the legislative declaration of what is a crime may not be sufficient to have it ultimately
so treated by the courts, such a designation is, nonetheless, necessary.
210. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 795-96 (1986). For an example of
statutory authority, see 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1988).
211. See, e.g., G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Webster Dictionary Co., 639 F.2d 29, 40-41 (1st
Cir. 1980).
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incarceration unless and until she obeys the court's order.212 The con-
ditional nature of the enforcement, and the defendant's present and
continuing ability to avoid any and all adverse action make contempt
proceedings unique.
Over time, the courts have grappled with the question of whether
contempt proceedings are civil or criminal. With respect to contempt
imposed as a punishment for past behavior, the courts ultimately
perceived that there is little to distinguish such an action from a crim-
inal proceeding. There is a violation which is deemed a "crime"
(whether designated by statute or inherent to the nature of the court's
order), a proceeding to adjudicate guilt, and the imposition of tra-
ditional criminal penalties. 213 Because "criminal contempt is a crime
in the ordinary sense, ' 214 the Supreme Court has recognized the need
to apply the same constitutional procedural and substantive protec-
tions ordinarily available in criminal cases. The individual is entitled,
for example, to a presumption of innocence and the proof beyond
a reasonable doubt standard, to confront, call and cross examine
witnesses, to a trial by jury if the potential penalty is a jail sentence
for more than six months, to invoke the privilege against self-in-
crimination, to the protection of the double jeopardy clause, and to
representation by counsel.2 1 5
The more problematic question has been how to treat contempts
that are imposed to coerce compliance. In compliance actions, for
example, there is no right to a trial by jury, a preponderance of the
evidence standard may apply, and the contemner may have the bur-
den of production or even the burden of persuasion on the element
of whether he is able to comply with the court's order.21 6 Defendants
212. See, e.g., United States v. Mars, 551 F.2d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 1977) (sentencing of
defendant in contempt was delayed to allow him to obey the court order and "purge himself
of contempt").
213. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) ("Criminal contempt is a
crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable
by fine or imprisonment or both"); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418
(1911).
Lower courts, deeming the criminal procedural protections extended to contempt proceed-
ings to be based on the "fundamental fairness" principle of the due process clause, have
sometimes hesitated to extend the full protection of the fifth and sixth amendments to such
cases. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 686 F.2d 334, 343 (5th Cir. 1982) (defendants facing
criminal contempt charges were not entitled to all constitutional safeguards afforded criminal
defendants, including arraignment and grand jury indictment because "[c]riminal contempts
have retained their unique status as quasi-criminal sanctions," subject only to fundamental
procedural fairness, not full application of the Bill of Rights).
214. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201.
215. See id. at 208-10; Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444; Note, Contempt of Court: Wisconsin's
Erasure of the Blurred Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 66 MARQ. L.
Rnv. 369, 380-81 (1983) (authored by Mama M. Tess).
216. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56,
have argued that these contempt proceedings are also criminal in na-
ture and that it therefore is constitutional error to apply only those
procedural protections that attend a civil suit.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue most recently in a case
involving a parent's failure to make monthly child support payments
as mandated by a California state court order. 217 The court adjudged
the defendant to be in contempt, suspended a twenty-five day jail
sentence, and imposed a three-year period of probation. As a con-
dition of probation, the court ordered the defendant to pay fifty dol-
lars per month to erase his accumulated arrearages. At this rate, he
would purge himself of the arrearages prior to the end of the pro-
bationary period. 218
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the hearing as
violative of due process of law. He argued that the proceeding was
criminal in nature and that, because California required him to
shoulder the burden of proof on his ability to comply with the order,
the state unconstitutionally shifted to him the obligation to disprove
every element of the crime charged. 21 9 All agreed that the burden of
proof rule would be unconstitutional if the proceeding were deemed
criminal, but acceptable if the proceeding were labeled civil. 220
The Court, in a five-three opinion, stated that the test for dis-
tinguishing between criminal and civil contempt lies in the character
of the relief the proceeding will afford:
If the relief provided is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial
if "the defendant stands committed unless and until he performs
the affirmative act required by the court's order," and is punitive
if "the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period."
If the relief is a fine, it is remedial when it is paid to the com-
plainant, and punitive when it is paid to the court, though a fine
that would be payable to the court is also remedial when the de-
fendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the affir-
mative act required by the court's order.221
The Court specifically declined to inquire into whether the un-
derlying purpose of the proceeding was to vindicate the court's au-
thority or to force the parent to conform his conduct to the original
75-76 (1948); see Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (civil contempt defendant may be
presumed to be able to comply with the court's order and have the burden to show
otherwise). According to Rylander, it would violate substantive due process for a defendant
to be coerced by civil contempt if it is clearly established that the contemner is unable to
comply with the terms of the order. Rylander, 460 U.S. at 757.
217. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988).
218. Id. at 639.
219. Id. at 628.
220. Id. at 637-38.
221. Id. at 632 (citations omitted).
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order.22 That question is difficult, it said, because often a court is
attempting to accomplish both objectives. 223 Such an inquiry also
would be "unseemly and improper" because it would require the
court "to psychoanalyze a subjective intent of the state's laws and
its courts."''224 Most importantly, the court opted for judging the na-
ture of the proceeding based solely on the character of the relief im-
posed because such an approach lends itself to the formulation of
rules that are clear and easy to follow. According to the Court, ap-
plication of these rules would allow the state courts to "plan their
own procedures around the traditional distinction between civil and
criminal remedies," which is a matter of "great importance to the
States.'"225
Beyond clarity, the Court's approach permits us to view a com-
pliance contempt as an essentially regulatory act. That is, a court
enforcing a contempt order is not seeking to punish for a past mis-
deed, rather, it is looking to control future conduct. Furthermore,
courts, unlike legislatures or administrative agencies, have limited
tools to regulate in this sense. They cannot, for example, deny the
defendant a student loan 226 or withhold a license.227
In this regard, the Court's approach is similar to its analysis in
cases challenging a legislative act as an unconstitutional bill of at-
tainder; that is, a legislative punishment without benefit of trial. In
Selective Service v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group,228 the
Court rejected a bill of attainder challenge to a congressional Act
that denied higher education benefits to male students who had not
registered for the draft. 229 The Court concluded that the statute did
222. Id. at 636-37.
223. Id. at 632-33. In contempt cases, both civil and criminal relief have aspects that
can be seen as remedial, punitive, or both. When a court fines or otherwise punishes a
contemner, not only is it vindicating its legal authority to enter the initial order, but it also
is seeking to give effect to the law's purpose of modifying the contemner's behavior.
224. Id. at 635.
225. Id. at 636. Because the majority was unable to determine whether the state court
meant its sentence of probation of the parent only to apply unless and until he purged
himself of the arrearages, it remanded the case for determination of this point. The dissenters
also believed that the nature of the proceeding could be gleaned from the type of the
sanction imposed, although their focus was somewhat different. Instead of looking at the
sanction to see if it was conditional, and hence civil, or determinate, and therefore criminal,
the dissent thought the relevant question was "whether the judgment inures to the benefit
of another party to the proceeding." Id. at 646 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
226. See Selective Service Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Int. Research Group, 468 U.S. 841
(1984) (denying student loans to men who fail to register for the draft).
227. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (applicant denied bar admission for refusal
to answer questions related to communist party membership).
228. 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
229. Id. at 847-56.
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not single out or punish any identifiable persons because affected
persons always remained free to comply with its provisions. There
was never a burden that the individuals were unable to avoid. 2 0 'Far
from attaching to ... past and ineradicable actions,' ineligibility for
Title IV benefits 'is made to turn upon continuingly contempora-
neous fact' which a student who wants public assistance can cor-
rect." ' 231 Likewise, when a civil contemner has the keys to the jail
cell in his pocket, he, too, faces a burden that is completely avoid-
able.
Under the Court's approach, it seems quite clear that enforce-
ment of statutes which permit injunctions against bias crimes, drug
"nuisances," or protective orders to stop domestic violence will be
regarded as criminal in nature if the court orders determinate jail
terms or fines for violation[s]. It follows that the procedure will be
constitutionally deficient if it does not afford the defendant all of
the procedural protections associated with a criminal proceeding. 232
Conversely, fines or incarceration imposed conditionally-unless and
until the defendant complies with the relevant court order-are the
result of a civil proceeding. That said, it is important to recover the
basic point about the basis on which we distinguish civil and criminal
proceedings. Even when we integrate the unique problem of con-
tempt enforcement into the equation, it remains the case that few
proceedings labeled civil by the legislature will be deemed criminal
for the application of constitutional norms. It is now necessary to
230. Id. at 847-51.
231. Id. at 851 (quoting Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 87 (1961)).
232. The general approach followed by the majority-looking to the conditional or
determinate nature of the relief-is consistent with prior cases. Over time, commentators
have voiced a number of criticisms of this approach, not all of which are valid. First, some
commentators have suggested that efforts to draw a distinction between criminal and civil
contempt is a hopeless muddle. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 183, 241-46 (1971). Contrary to this assertion, the rules identified by a majority of
the Court have been in existence for a long time, are fairly straightforward, and have been
"consistently applied." Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1988). Other critics have
noted the confusion that may result when the very same activity can be pursued by criminal
as well as civil contempt. See Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion
Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 677, 683 (1981). Such an
observation, however, is no more troublesome than recognizing that a whole variety of
conduct can be pursued either civilly or criminally.
A more significant ground for objection to the Court's approach is that a defendant may
not know whether she is being pursued criminally or civilly until the sentence is actually
imposed. There is, however, an easy solution to this problem. Even in jurisdictions like
California, which have merged their civil and criminal contempt proceedings, there can be
a procedure similar to an election of remedies at the outset of the proceeding which would
give all parties proper notice of what sanction may properly be imposed.
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explore the significance of this conclusion in terms of specific con-
stitutional protections.
IV. The Limits of the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction
In view of this narrow definition of what constitutes a criminal
proceeding, a natural concern arises: what does such a narrow def-
inition mean for the protection of individual liberties? Do we now
have reason to fear that the government can impose all manner of
"civil" punishments upon us, unchecked by constitutional norms?
Plainly not. As important as it may be to distinguish between civil
and criminal cases, it may be more important to understand that the
consequences of that distinction are limited.
First, although it is true that proceedings designated "criminal"
will entitle the defendant to nearly all the protections of the fourth,
fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments, it is not true that finding a pro-
ceeding to be "civil" necessarily will deprive the defendant of all
these protections. Only the strictly procedural protections-indict-
ment, speedy trial, and the like-are or should be limited to criminal
cases. Protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, self-
incrimination, and double jeopardy have been recognized in some
circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the court unmistakably
has concluded that the proceeding at bar was civil in nature.
Second, there are many potent constitutional guarantees, such
as the due process clause, that apply to all civil matters. 233 Civil pro-
cedural due process, while not as extensive as criminal law procedural
protections, does impose significant safeguards against arbitrary, op-
pressive, or erroneous action. Much of the criticism aimed at civil
proceedings like forfeitures or statutory fines focuses on government
arbitrariness, excess, and disproportionality-all of which can be
curbed without necessarily importing the procedural baggage of crim-
inal trials into civil cases. Once this fact is recognized, a narrow def-
inition of criminal proceedings seems more palatable. Indeed, once
the significance of the criminal-civil law distinction is relegated to
a minor role, courts may be encouraged to give a more functional
and less formal reading to the provisions of the fourth, fifth, and
eighth amendments. Simultaneously, courts may take greater care in
examining how particular civil schemes operate to ensure that they
233. Moreover, the civil nature of a proceeding will entitle the defendant to far more
expansive discovery rights. See note 344 infra. Aware of this possibility, the government
may prefer to structure parallel criminal and civil proceedings so that the civil action follows
the criminal action.
do, in fact, comport with constitutional norms. Additionally, by nar-
rowly defining what is a criminal proceeding, legislatures are free to
think creatively about ways to control antisocial behavior without
being saddled with the procedural rules applicable in criminal cases.
A. Confining the Criminal-Civil Distinction to Procedural Protections
Only
There are many reasons to confine the criminal-civil dichotomy
to procedural issues. First, the language of the Constitution seems
to support it. The bulk of criminal procedural protections are found
in the sixth amendment, which specifically applies to "criminal pro-
secutions." 23 4 With the exception of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, the substantive constitutional protections, though
undoubtedly aimed at criminal cases, are not by their terms so con-
fined. The Court itself has described them as having "broader
scope. ' 23 5 Second, the norms in constitutional criminal procedure are
quite strict and inflexible. They exact heavy, perhaps unnecessary,
costs that may not be justified in proceedings where they are not
plainly mandated. Third, the civil procedural due process protections
offer a flexible safety valve in that, where the stakes are high enough,
the courts in a civil proceeding may impose safeguards similar to
those mandated in criminal proceedings. 2 6 In a sense, as far as pro-
cedural protections in civil proceedings go, we can have our cake and
eat it too. Finally, the very rigorous procedures required in criminal
cases give particular moral force and power to the collective judg-
ment of "guilty. ' 23 7
234. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
235. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253 (1980).
236. For example, one such safeguard is the imposition of a higher burden of proof.
Although the Supreme Court has not required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil
context, it has imposed the stringent requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence
in certain circumstances. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1981) (risk of error
in action to terminate parental rights because of child neglect mandates a "clear and
convincing" standard of proof); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (balancing
of state's interest in providing care to mentally ill citizens with individual's interest in
avoiding deprivation of liberty requires a "clear and convincing" standard of proof for
involuntary civil commitment). Another safeguard might be the appointment of counsel. See
Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (although the due process
clause does not require appointment of counsel in every parental rights termination hearing,
such an appointment may be required in individual cases).
237. The procedures, more than any other feature-even the penalty imposed-express
the significance of guilt adjudication. Strict and rigorous protections for the defendant mark
the proceedings as a matter taken so seriously that we want to have overriding confidence
in the ultimate determination, and, at the same time, we want to give the accused every
benefit of the doubt. See Underwood, supra note 186 at 1306-08 (1977).
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Therefore, in applying constitutional provisions not expressly
tied to a criminal or civil context, we should ask what values underlie
these protections and whether they are implicated in a particular pro-
ceeding, even though it may be "civil." 21 In many cases, the Court
has struggled to conduct this provision-by-provision analysis. This
fact accounts for the salutary outcome, mistakenly lamented by some
commentators, that the very same civil proceeding can enjoy the pro-
tections of the fifth amendment and yet not enjoy the protections
of the sixth. 2 9 Forfeiture proceedings provide a good example. For-
feiture proceedings have not been deemed "criminal prosecutions"
with respect to the right to a grand jury indictment or to appointment
of counsel, yet they have been deemed sufficiently punitive in some
circumstances to trigger the privilege against self-incrimination. 240
This functional sensitivity to the values underlying a particular
constitutional provision, rather than a wooden and formal decla-
ration that certain constitutional provisions simply do not apply in
the civil context, tracks the evolution of search and seizure doctrine
under the fourth amendment. Initially, the Supreme Court concluded
that non-criminal regulatory inspection programs like municipal fire,
health, and safety inspections of home or'businesses "touch at most
upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the
fourteenth [and fourth] amendment's protection against official in-
trusions."241 Later cases, however, repudiated this notion, and it is
now comfortably settled that noncriminal regulatory or administra-
tive searches fall squarely within fourth amendment protections. 242
This is because the fourth amendment's concern with invasions of
privacy and arbitrary governmental intrusions can arise in both crim-
inal and noncriminal contexts.
238. The criminal-civil distinction continues to bedevil the courts in many areas, but
doctrinal shifts in interpreting the protections against double jeopardy, excessive fines, and
self incrimination may point to a less formal reliance on the dichotomy. In some areas,
however, such as cases involving the ex post facto clause, the courts may be unwilling to
wean themselves from the simplicity the distinction offers. In the ex post facto cases, the
Supreme Court has ignored inconsistent history and a functional reading of the provision
in favor of a bright line test that limits the ex post facto clause to criminal cases only. See
L. TRmE, A RmCAN CONsTImoNwA LAW 632-41 (2d ed. 1988).
239. Clark, supra note 22, at 385-91.
240. Compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886) (privilege against self
incrimination applicable to forfeiture proceedings) with One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.
United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (per curiam) (double jeopardy not applicable to
particular forfeiture proceedings).
241. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
242. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court of San
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Of course, the fact that a search or seizure arises in furtherance
of a criminal or civil investigation may have a material effect on the
Court's ultimate calculation of what is "reasonable" in fourth
amendment terms. But this result does not obtain because of the na-
ture of the proceeding per se; it results because in a regulatory setting
an individual may have a diminished expectation of privacy, the de-
gree of intrusion involved in the search or seizure may be minimal,
or the regulatory need to conduct the search or seizure may be over-
riding. 243
With respect to the substantive constitutional safeguards, in-
cluding double jeopardy and the protection against excessive fines,
the Court recently has signalled that these protections also apply in
civil proceedings. 244 Consistent with the underlying values of these
constitutional provisions, the ultimate distinction the Court seeks to
draw in these areas is whether the governmental act seeks to punish.
Sometimes the criminal or civil nature of a proceeding will be helpful
in answering that question, but it will not automatically be deter-
minative. 245 Thus a criminal prosecution followed by a civil action
to recover a monetary penalty for the same offense can trigger the
double jeopardy protection against being punished twice for the same
offense. Similarly, a civil monetary penalty may be a fine that is,
constitutionally speaking, excessive.
B. The Double Jeopardy Clause
The double jeopardy clause provides protection against being
tried twice or punished twice for the same offense.24 The prohibition
243. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (upholding
breath, urine, and blood testing of railroad workers following a major rail accident);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (upholding
drug testing of United States Customs agents).
In addition, the noncriminal regulatory setting of search and seizure cases may also
influence the Court's decision to invoke the exclusionary rule after it has found that an
unreasonable search and seizure has occurred. See INS v. Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1033 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 433-34 (1976); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 693 (1965). See also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
89-90 (3d ed. 1985).
244. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (double jeopardy); Browning-
Farris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (excessive fines).
245. "We have always recognized a distinction between governmental action intended to
punish and that which is not," Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668, 678-79 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) and United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987)).
246. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 168 (1873). The double jeopardy clause states: "[N]or shall any person be
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against double prosecutions applies whether the defendant has been
previously convicted or previously acquitted. 247
Traditionall,, double jeopardy was not applicable if the second
trial against a defendant was civil. 248 Thus, as a protection against
multiple prosecutions, the clause contemplated two criminal pro-
ceedings for the same offense. When an individual already criminally
prosecuted faced a civil suit for damages, monetary penalties, or for-
feiture predicated on the same conduct that was the basis of the crim-
inal prosecution, this was not considered a violation of double
jeopardy. As one commentator explained, "Jeopardy does not attach
at proceedings which are essentially civil, on the ground that the rec-
ognition of both civil and criminal claims for the same incident re-
veals a legislative intent that both be allowed." 249 The rationale offered
to support this rule was that the government, like a private indi-
vidual, was entitled to a civil remedy for its losses even if the de-
fendant previously had been criminally convicted. 20 The essential
question under such a straightforward approach was whether the sec-
ond proceeding was criminal, and barred as unconstitutional, or civil,
and presumptively constitutional.
The matter became more complicated, however, after Breed v.
Jones.25 In Breed the Court held that the defendant could not be
tried criminally for the same offense that had formed the basis of
an earlier juvenile court action against him. The Court rejected the
formalistic contention that the double jeopardy clause was inappli-
cable simply because a civil label had been attached to juvenile cases.212
Instead the Court said: "[In terms of potential consequences, there
is little to distinguish an adjudicatory hearing such as was held in
this case from a traditional criminal prosecution. ' 253 This was be-
cause the adjudicatory hearing's "potential consequences include[d]
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The courts have rejected any literal interpretation of the double jeopardy
protection. Rather, they have interpreted it broadly to ensure "that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). See generally J. SIOLER, DOUBLE JEOPARtDY (1969).
247. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 662 (1896) (previous
conviction); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 177-78 (1889) (previous acquittal).
248. E.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985); cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959) (clause also not applicable if second trial brought by a different sovereign).
249. WmT-EBREA & SLOBOON, CRm-NAL PROCEDURE § 30.02, at 725 (1986).
250. E.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1943).
251. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
252. Id. at 529.
253. Id. at 530.
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both the stigma inherent in [a] determination [that defendant had
violated the criminal law] and the deprivation of liberty for many
years. ' 254 Thus, the psychological, physical, and financial burdens
attending such a proceeding were comparable to those incident to a
criminal prosecution .255
The Breed analysis seemed to put certain civil proceedings and
administrative hearings within the reach of the double jeopardy pro-
hibition, and the Court in the past had warned that a civil label would
not necessarily negate a multiple prosecution claim.25 6 Yet, subse-
quent to Breed the Court has not decided a case where the civil pro-
ceeding was "so punitive in purpose or effect" that it constituted
a second criminal prosecution for double jeopardy purposes.2 57 In
effect, the Breed decision has been isolated and confined to juvenile
cases as a part of the "constitutionalization" of the juvenile court
process.
Since Breed, lower courts simply have continued to follow the
Supreme Court's earlier approach in double jeopardy cases. This tra-
ditional treatment was exemplified in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
v. United States.258 There the Court held double jeopardy inappli-
cable in a proceeding to forfeit undeclared imports. The Court asked
whether the purpose of the proceeding in question could be char-
acterized as "remedial rather than punitive. ' 25 9 If so, double jeop-
ardy was not in issue. Using the same approach, the double jeopardy
guarantee has been held inapplicable to: involuntary civil commit-
ment proceedings; 260 disciplinary proceedings against prisoners af-
fecting their release date; 261 civil contempt proceedings; 262 civil
paternity actions;263 civil lawsuits recovering treble damages or pu-
nitive damages; 264 and proceedings to suspend or terminate govern-
ment employment, 265 a government contract, 266 or a license to engage
in profession or business.2 67
254. Id. at 529.
255. Id. at 530-31.
256. See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956).
257. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
258. 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
259. Id. at 237.
260. State v. Hudson, 121 N.H. 6, 11-12, 425 A.2d 255, 257-58 (1981).
261. State v. Kerns, 201 Neb. 617, 619-20, 271 N.W.2d 48, 50 (1978).
262. United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1987).
263. Moore v. Hafeeza, 212 N.J. Super. 399, 401-02, 515 A.2d 271, 272 (1986).
264. McCutchen v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 699 F. Supp. 701, 708 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
265. Bart v. State Dep't of Law Enforcement, Div. of State Police, 52 Il1. App. 3d 487,
490-91, 367 N.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1977).
266. United States v. Hartley, 612 F.2d 1009, 1010 (5th Cir. 1980).
267. Emory v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 748 F.2d 1023, 1027 (5th Cir.
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This was the state of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence re-
garding the double jeopardy clause until its recent decision in United
States v. Halper.268 In Halper the Court held that the government
may not proceed civilly against a defendant already criminally con-
victed for the same offense if it seeks a punitive rather than remedial
sanction. 269 The government, like a private citizen, may be entitled
to recompense, but the imposition of a punitive sanction would vi-
olate the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments. 270
Irwin Halper worked as a manager of a laboratory providing
service to Medicaid patients. He filed sixty-five separate false claims
for reimbursement by inflating the rate of his claims to twelve dollars
from an allowable three dollars. As a result, the government overpaid
his firm a total of $585. Since each submission was a separate fraud-
ulent act, the government indicted him on sixty-five separate counts
of making false claims. After obtaining a criminal conviction, the
government also sought the full $2,000 civil statutory penalty for
each separate act of fraud for a total of $130,000 in penalties.
Under these circumstances, the Court found that the statutory
penalty constituted "punishment" because the amount sought was
entirely disproportionate to any reasonable amount the government
could claim for damages and costs incurred because of the defen-
dant's acts. The Court stated:
The rule is one of reason: Where a defendant previously has sus-
tained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the sub-
sequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of
compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to
qualify as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the word, then
the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government's dam-
ages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes
a second punishment.27'
Despite extremely cautious language, 272 and important unan-
swered questions, 273 Halper is a major doctrinal breakthrough. In the
267. Emory v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 748 F.2d 1023, 1027 (5th Cir.
1984).
268. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
269. Id. at 448-49, 451.
270. Id. at 446.
271. Id. at 449-50 (footnote omitted).
272. For example, the Court called its holding "a rule for the rare case," id. at 449,
and said, "[w]e do not consider our ruling far reaching ... ." Id. at 449-50.
273. The Court had no occasion to consider whether double jeopardy would bar a
subsequent civil proceeding when a previous criminal proceeding had resulted in acquittal.
Under such circumstances the defendant could not complain of a double punishment, as in
Halper, but only of a double prosecution or a second attempt to impose punishment. The
issue on these facts is whether the double jeopardy rule against "repeated attempts to
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context of double jeopardy jurisprudence, it renders irrelevant the
distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. That distinction,
the Court said, is an "abstract approach," perhaps useful in some
contexts, but "not well suited to the context of the 'humane interests'
safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of mul-
tiple punishments." 274 A violation of double jeopardy's intrinsically
personal protection "can be identified only by assessing the character
of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery
of the state. ' 27 Thus, Halper rejected formalism in favor of a func-
tional, interpretive methodology. Rather than rely on the dichotomy
between civil and criminal cases, the Court interpreted the double
jeopardy clause in light of the evils it was intended to prevent. If
double jeopardy protects a defendant from double punishment, she
should enjoy that protection even if one of the proceedings used to
punish her was civil and not criminal.
Of course, the rule of Halper does not necessarily open all civil
proceedings to double jeopardy claims. It will have no application
at all where only a civil proceeding is pursued. If, for example, the
government discovers cocaine in a car it may elect to initiate civil
forfeiture proceedings to seize the car and decline to commence a
criminal prosecution. In that event, the government has chosen the
civil proceeding as an alternative to criminal prosecution. The de-
convict an individual for an alleged offense," Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187
(1957), applies even if the second attempt to punish is not through the medium of a criminal
proceeding. The resolution of the issue turns on whether the double jeopardy clause's
protection is against the special burdens imposed on a defendant in cumulative criminal
actions-notoriety, risk of incarceration, pretrial detention, or bail conditions-or whether
it extends simply to the inequity of compelling a defendant to fend off repeated attempts
to punish her, no matter what the form.
On the one hand, it could be argued that the burden imposed as a result of having to
defend oneself in a second civil proceeding is not sufficiently onerous to trigger a double
jeopardy bar because it neither subjects a defendant to the same "embarrassment, expense
and ordeal" as is associated with a criminal trial nor compels "him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity." Id. at 187. Moreover, since a subsequent civil proceeding
certainly would be allowed if it were an action to recover compensatory damages, it also
could be argued that the proceeding itself does not become more of an ordeal simply because
the government is seeking a larger recovery. Furthermore, principles of res judicata limit
the government to only one subsequent civil proceeding-whether to recover compensatory
or punitive sanctions. Consequently, the specter of repeated trials designed to wear down
and wear out the defendant will not materialize.
On the other hand, it seems inequitable to bar double punishment against a convicted
defendant but to permit two attempts at punishing someone who has been found not guilty
of the criminal offense. One commentator has offered the solution of permitting a subsequent
civil suit after a criminal acquittal, but only for amounts in the nature of recompense. Note,
Crossing the Line, supra note 18, at 454.
274. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
275. Id.
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fendant, therefore, is not in "double" jeopardy, but only "single"
jeopardy.
Double jeopardy also is not in issue if the government pursues
conventional criminal penalties like incarceration coupled with pun-
ishments like forfeiture in a single criminal proceeding, where the
additional penalties actually are incorporated into the criminal sen-
tence. In such instances, the punishments may, in some fashion, be
"excessive" but they are not multiple in the double jeopardy sense.
Halper also may be irrelevant where, although it looks as if
someone is being punished twice (whether criminally or civilly) for
the same offense, the punishments nevertheless are allowed because
the same offense actually is not in issue in the separate actions. As
an illustration, the courts have wrestled with the question of whether
punishment for contempt of court will bar a later prosecution for
some or all of the acts that constituted the contempt. 276 Whether such
"double" punishments are permitted depends on whether "the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions... [and] whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not. ' 277 Under this test, a lesser included of-
fense ordinarily is considered to be the same offense as the more
serious one.28 However, multiple different acts, even if they arise out
of the same transaction, can be the basis for multiple punishments.
Thus, a defendant can be punished for one count of illegal impor-
tation of drugs and also for a criminal conspiracy to import based
on her involvement in a series of drug importation transactions over
a five and one half year period. 279 In such a case, the conviction for
importation does not require proof of an illegal agreement with oth-
ers, and the conviction for conspiracy does not require proof of im-
portation. In contrast, in Halper the same false reimbursement claims
that provided the basis of the criminal action against the defendant
also were the basis of the later statutory penalty proceeding against
him.280
276. See infra text accompanying notes 464-467.
277. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
278. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (conviction of offense of operating a car
without the owner's consent barred subsequent prosecution for auto theft because the same
facts were needed to prove both offenses); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977)
(conviction for felony murder barred subsequent prosecution for robbery; the greater crime
of felony murder necessarily depended on conviction for the lesser felony of robbery).
279. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
280. Some state courts take a different view of what constitutes the same offense and
are more willing to limit subsequent proceedings based on a "same transaction" test. This
test goes beyond looking at the evidence needed to prove each offense and focuses on the
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The most significant limit on Halper, however, is that we may
not always know whether a given civil proceeding actually operates
"to punish." For monetary penalties, Halper gives us a useful albeit
broad formula: the government is entitled to rough remedial justice,
including actual damages and costs or any rough approximation of
that amount. 28' Anything beyond this generously phrased allowance
will be equivalent to a fine. For adverse actions that are not measured
in currency, however, the matter is less clear. Is it a double pun-
ishment to be convicted of a crime such as fraud and later to be
banned from the list of government contract bidders, or dropped
from the rolls of attorneys, or committed to a mental institution?
Here we need further guidance as to what punishment is for double
jeopardy purposes.
In this context, any definition of punishment must enable us to
distinguish between punishment on the one hand and regulation or
treatment on the other. Common experience and common sense dic-
tate that a criminal conviction for aggravated assault should not bar
a departmental proceeding to suspend the police officer for the same
conduct, or that a conviction for bribery should not prevent the dis-
missal of a housing inspector for accepting bribes. Indeed, if we al-
lowed the fact of a previous conviction to bar administrative action
against an individual for the same conduct, felons would enjoy im-
munity from regulation to which others are not subject. Moreover,
history suggests that the multiple punishments against which double
jeopardy protects are those traditionally associated with criminal pro-
ceedings, such as fines and incarceration. 28 2
defendant's actions that have given rise to multiple prosecutions. If the charges or proceedings
against a person all arise out of the same act, occurrence, episode, or transaction, then the
government generally will be limited to a single prosecution or proceeding to punish. See,
e.g., Cowart v. State, 461 So. 2d 21, 23 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Boyette v. State, 172 Ga.
App. 683, 684, 324 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1984).
281. The Court acknowledged that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to determine
the precise damages suffered by the government through fraud or another wrong. Accord-
ingly, the government is to be given the benefit of the doubt and permitted to have what
are, in effect, reasonable liquidated damages. This would include, the Court noted, such
imprecise but roughly remedial devices as a "fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages" provision.
Procedurally, if a defendant can make a plausible second punishment double jeopardy claim,
he will be
entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and costs to determine if
the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment. We must leave to the
trial court the discretion to determine on the basis of such an accounting the size
of the civil sanction the Government may receive without crossing the line between
remedy and punishment.
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1989) (footnote omitted).
282. See SIGLER, supra note 246, at 4-34. Increasingly, double jeopardy issues are arising
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The conventional definition of punishment is thus inadequate
here. That definition equates punishment with a burden imposed in
response to an offense against legal rules and for the purpose of re-
habilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, or retribution. 283 Under that
definition, regulation can be, and often is, punishment. 284
For double jeopardy purposes, then, sanctions will not be deemed
to be "punishment" if they are reasonably calculated to constitute
a rough compensatory remedy, reasonably serve regulatory goals
adopted in the public interest, or provide treatment for persons un-
able to care for themselves. As Halper itself indicated, however, the
courts actually must determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a
given burden is reasonably calculated to achieve and actually does
achieve the non-punishment goals of recompense, regulation, or
treatment.
The general definition of punishment as a burden imposed be-
cause of a past offense against legal rules helps to show why some
burdens-specifically, involuntary commitment or fines for civil con-
tempt-are not punishment for double jeopardy purposes; indeed,
they are not punishment at all. Both are forward-looking and in-
determinate, depending as they do upon the individual's future be-
havior.
in criminal RICO cases. See, e.g., United States v. Esposito, 612 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1986). The questions raised in these cases
are whether an acquittal on a RICO racketeering charge bars a prosecution for one of the
predicate acts and whether conviction for a predicate act bars a later prosecution for
racketeering. Although the Third Circuit answered no in both instances, there is reason to
doubt the soundness of the court's conclusions in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990). In Grady, the Court held that double
jeopardy prevented the subsequent criminal prosecution of a man for reckless manslaughter,
negligent homicide, and reckless assault when he already had been convicted of misdemeanor
driving while intoxicated and failing to keep to the right. Since the later charges were to be
proven by the same conduct that constituted the misdemeanor offense, double jeopardy was
a bar. Contrary to the Third Circuit's view, the Grady "same conduct" rule would appear
to bar a double prosecution-two bites at the apple-for racketeering and a predicate act,
at least to the extent that the same conduct was in issue in both cases.
This is not to say, however, that a defendant could not be convicted of both a RICO
racketeering offense and the predicate offenses on which it was based. Since Congress has
made clear that these are separate offenses, prosecution for both is possible, and consecutive
sentences may be imposed. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Successive
prosecutions to achieve that result, however, would be barred. The Supreme Court undoubt-
edly will be called upon to clarify this matter.
283. See supra note 170.
284. Reliance on the definition of punishment derived from other constitutional provi-
sions is not always appropriate. Foundational definitions must always be rooted in the values
of each particular provision. For example, punishment may have a broader meaning for bill
of attainder prohibitions than for double jeopardy protections. This is because the bill of
attainder clause is concerned not only with individual liberty but also with separation of
powers.
1379
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In the final analysis, Halper's significance lies precisely in those
areas involving monetary exactions such as tax penalties, securities
penalties, statutory fines of all varieties, and forfeitures, which like
Halper itself extend beyond contraband or crime proceeds. Prose-
cutors now will have to consider better coordination of their actions
with those of regulatory agencies that have enforcement powers. Some
federal agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission for ex-
ample, routinely seek civil penalties in matters that they handle. Such
regulatory actions now run the risk of foreclosing a later prosecution
based upon the same conduct. Furthermore, if qui tam actions are
found to fall within the Halper rule, prosecutors will have to monitor
more closely suits brought by citizens to enforce statutory penalties
against those who have harmed or defrauded the government.2 85 Of
course, if the agency limits itself to seeking actual damages, or to
a rough approximation thereof, then the Halper rule will not require
a change in enforcement practices .286
285. In Halper the Court expressly noted that its ruling was inapplicable to "litigation
between private parties," and it specifically declined to decide whether its new double
jeopardy protection would apply to qui tam actions. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451.
In this regard, the root of the problem lies in the state action doctrine. The protections
of the Bill of Rights only apply against government actors. Nevertheless, lawsuits brought
by private individuals to vindicate harms done to themselves may trigger the protections of
due process of law, because the government is providing the forum and prescribing the rules
of dispute adjudication. The mere fact that a person sues another, however, does not make
that suit an action involving state action for purposes of double jeopardy or excessive fines
protection. Thus in Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989), the
Supreme Court rejected an excessive fines challenge to a punitive damages award in litigation
between private parties.
Except in form, a qui tam suit is not a lawsuit between private parties. The reality is that
the citizen plaintiff-not harmed herself or claiming any personal cause of action-is simply
the agent or bounty hunter for the government. In a qui tam suit, the citizen "has no
interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute." United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) (citation omitted) (impliedly acknowledging
qui tam as a government suit by applying double jeopardy analysis in that context). It is as
if the government, for the purpose of a particular lawsuit, deputizes the private citizen as
a special assistant United States Attorney.
The structure of the qui tam action under the False Claims Act also lends support to the
view that a qui tam suit is a government action. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988). The
Act gives the Department of Justice significant control over the action. In particular, notice
of the suit must be given to the government, which can take over the litigation entirely or
intervene within 60 days. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)-(4) (1988). Moreover, a qui tam action
bars suits by other citizens seeking recovery for the same conduct of the defendant. 31
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (1988). Thus, it seems clear that a qui tam action constitutes state
action.
Whether private citizen RICO suits-which provide recovery for individual harms and a
means to enforce government penalties-are "state action" for the purpose of double
jeopardy or excessive fines protections is uncertain.
286. See Himelstein, Crimping Enforcement?, Legal Times, June 5, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
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(1) The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-
ishment inflicted." '287 Although the amendment by its terms is not
limited to criminal cases, the focus on bail, fines, and punishment
strongly suggests that the Framers intended such a construction. To
date, the Supreme Court largely has confined application of the
amendment to criminal matters. 288
Nevertheless, in a recently decided case the Court signaled that,
although it would not apply the excessive fines clause to a punitive
damage award between private parties, it might apply it in some civil
contexts. 2 9 The majority specifically contrasted private punitive
damages awards with government imposition of monetary penal-
ties-whether in the criminal or civil context:
Here [with a private punitive damage award] the government of
Vermont had not taken a positive step to punish, as it most ob-
viously does in the criminal context, nor has it used the civil courts
to extract large payments or forfeitures for the purpose of raising
revenue or disabling some individual.290
There is ample historical evidence to support the view that the
excessive fines clause derives from English Law limitations on the
imposition not only of criminal fines and penalties but also of stat-
utory penalties and amercements (payments for civil wrongs against
the King). 291 This history, combined with the clause's general purpose
of preventing abusive governmental exaction of monetary penalties,
strongly supports application of the clause to statutory penalties and
forfeitures. 292 The Court itself has characterized a fine as any for-
feiture or monetary penalty or sanction exacted by the government
as a punishment. 293 Furthermore, a punishment includes any "civil
287. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
288. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 573-74 (1833); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1977); Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262-63.
289. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 273-75. A number of commentators have argued that
the excessive fines clause should apply to limit private punitive damages awards. See, e.g.,
Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40
VAND. L. REv. 1233 (1987); Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An
Analytical Framework for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. Rav. 1433 (1987) (authored
by Lyndon F. Bittle); Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 Mtc. L. REv. 1699 (1987) (authored by Andrew
M. Kenefick).
290. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275.
291. Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv.
139, 154-57, (1986); Massey, supra note 289, at 1240-69.
292. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 266-71.
293. Id. at 265.
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sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,
but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes. ' 294
To date, the lower courts have refused to apply the excessive
fines clause to civil forfeitures, 29 although they have applied it to
criminal forfeitures. 296 The usual rationale is that forfeitures are in
rem proceedings against property, a fiction that has justified exces-
sive and abusive government action through the centuries. As many
commentators have noted, the entire subject of forfeiture needs re-
examination and overhaul.297 The in rem fiction no longer masks the
reality that forfeitures are often the equivalent of monetary fines.
As to what is excessive, 298 courts have relied upon the propor-
tionality rules utilized in eighth amendment cruel and unusual pun-
294. United States v. Halper 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989).
295. E.g., United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 233 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 364 (1989).
296. E.g., United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987).
297. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 4, at 434-36. A major complaint regarding existing
forfeiture law is that completely innocent parties may forfeit property when someone else
uses it in a crime. See Note, Federal Civil Forfeiture: An Ill-Conceived Scheme Unfairly
Deprives an Innocent Party of Its Property Interest, 62 U. DET. L. REv. 87 (1984) (authored
by Bruce C. Conybeare, Jr.) (unfairness of forfeiture of innocent third party's property
dictates a change in federal forfeiture laws to make them more like the Uniform Civil
Forfeiture law used by most states).
Commentators have proposed two main categories of solutions. The first group proposes
limiting the use of forfeiture. See, e.g., Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law & Policy: A Proposal
for Reform, 19 WM. & MARY L. REv. 661 (1978) (proposing that forfeiture only be used
as a penalty in criminal cases, imposed under the discretion of the judge); Comment, Civil
Forfeiture and Innocent Third Parties, 3 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 323 (1983) (authored by Dennis
R. Hewitt) (arguing that civil forfeiture should only apply to contraband and that all other
forfeitures should be characterized as criminal).
The second group proposes creating additional procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Kandaras,
Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need to Guarantee a Prompt Trial, 33 U. FLA.
L. Rav. 195 (1981) (forfeiture ought to be barred when the government unreasonably delays
initiation of proceedings after seizure); Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property For-
feiture Statutes: The Need for Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925 (1980) (due
process requires that an immediate post-seizure hearing be held to determine whether probable
cause exists to believe the property is subject to forfeiture); Note, Constitutional Rights and
Civil Forfeiture Actions, supra note 4, at 399 (use immunity should be granted to claimants
in civil forfeiture cases who face a possible criminal prosecution because claimant has burden
of proof in forfeiture action); Current Topic, Civil Forfeiture, Warrantless Property Seizures,
and the Fourth Amendment, 5 YALE L. & POL'y Rav. 428 (1987) (seizure of property
pursuant to forfeiture laws should be subject to the fourth amendment warrant requirements).
A broader solution for the problems in forfeiture law has been proposed by Professor
Clark. He criticizes the suggestion that some constitutional protections should apply to civil
forfeiture, but not others. He suggests a new definition of punitive that, when met, would
trigger all protections: "If the law places special burdens specifically on a group of persons
who have violated some legal prohibition, then there should exist a presumption that the
law is punitive, absent convincing evidence of some other purpose." Clark, supra note 22,
at 385.
298. It should be noted that the Supreme Court never has applied the excessive fines
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ishment jurisprudence, 299 most notably those posited in Solem v.
Helm.30 0 The Court in Solem stated:
[A] court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment
should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sen-
tences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions. 30'
If the Court's dictum in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Dis-
posal,30 2 is to be taken seriously, the same approach should be taken
in civil forfeiture cases. Indeed, although the application of the ex-
cessive fines clause to civil cases can operate to place ceilings on stat-
utory fines and other monetary penalties, its real impact will come
in the area of civil forfeitures because of the magnificent dispro-
portionality between culpability and amounts seized.
Of course, some care must be taken to specify how propor-
tionality rules would apply in forfeiture cases. Forfeitures extend to
different kinds of property-contraband, proceeds, and instrumen-
talities. Any proportionality rule inherently would be satisfied if the
property seized were contraband or proceeds. The law prohibits pos-
session or ownership of contraband and an individual should have
no greater rights simply because she has more of the illegal material
than someone else. As to the proceeds of illegal activities, the idea
of preventing someone from profiting from his wrong presumably
carries its own sense of proportion-that is, no profit, no matter how
small or large, may be retained if it was generated by a wrongful act.
The situation is quite different, however, with respect to in-
strumentalities. Many statutes permit the government to seize prop-
erty used in the commission of a crime.30 3 For example, if a car or
clause specifically to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Since 1962, however, the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment has
been applied to the states, most notably in sentencing cases. See Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). The Robinson court cited Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
463 (1946), for the proposition that the fourteenth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment by the states. The matter of the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment was
settled in Robinson and the Court has assumed that the excessive bail clause of the same
amendment also applies to the states. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971); see
also Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). There appears to be no reason to treat the excessive fines clause differently.
299. See, e.g., United States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987).
300. 463 U.S. 277, 290-95 (1983).
301. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. With respect to the gravity of the offense, the Court
further explained that factors such as whether the offense was a violent crime or merely a
crime against property, whether the magnitude of the harm was great or small, and the
level of culpability of the offender would be appropriate
considerations. Id. at 292-94.
302. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
303. See supra notes 86-88.
yacht is used to transport illegal drugs, or an apartment or house
is used as the situs of prostitution or drug trafficking, it is subject
to forfeiture. In these cases, the application of proportionality rules
make sense because the amount of loss visited upon the property
owner may have no relationship to the seriousness of the underlying
offense, the extent of harm caused, or the owner's culpability or de-
gree of involvement in the offense. The property owner might be a
drug kingpin or merely an inattentive lessor. The car owner might
be transporting several kilos of cocaine or a small amount of ma-
rijuana, and the car itself might be a new $50,000 vehicle or a worth-
less jalopy. The home owner may be someone who, although culpable,
was, by happenstance, a member of the group that allowed her home
to be the place where the crime was planned. Forfeitures are excessive
fines when the amount exacted turns on the accidental and irrelevant
details of how the crime was carried out and not on the nature of
the crime or the owner's connection to it.1°4
C. The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Extending the privilege against self-incrimination to civil cases
presents a much more difficult interpretive problem than applying
double jeopardy or excessive fines protection to such cases. The ex-
press language of the amendment itself appears to confine the priv-
ilege to criminal cases: "No person .. . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."305 Despite this seem-
ingly definitive language, courts long ago transcended any literal or
narrow historical reading of the clause. 3°6
The Supreme Court has flatly rejected the idea that the privilege
is confined to protecting a defendant at her criminal trial. The priv-
ilege applies to proceedings leading up to the criminal trial, including
grand jury proceedings30 7 and custodial police questioning. 08 The
Court also has held that a witness in any governmental proceeding-
civil or criminal-can invoke the privilege if her answers will lead
304. See Fried, supra note 4, at 387-88 (criticizing "the extreme and arbitrary dispro-
portion between offense and remedy" as violative of both due process of law and the
excessive fines clause).
305. U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added).
306. Moreover, most commentators concede that "[t]he history of the privilege does not
settle the policy of the privilege." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 295 (J. McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
307. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (privilege applies, but Miranda
warnings need not be given).
308. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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to or provide evidence that could be used in a subsequent criminal
case. 309 In civil cases, however, this use of the privilege is limited by
the requirement that the evidence concealed must in fact tend to in-
criminate the witness. 310 Invoking the privilege in a civil case may
have adverse consequences if, for example, the party invoking the
privilege is prevented from using the concealed evidence on her own
behalf31" ' or if the court draws an adverse inference from the party's
refusal to divulge information.31 2
Finally, the Supreme Court has protected the privileg6 in civil
settings, such as legislative investigations, where the state has called
a witness to testify and threatened her with sanctions if she invokes
her privilege against self-incrimination. 313 The state in these cases,
though conceding the existence of the privilege, has attempted to
induce a waiver by threatening the witness with immediate job loss
or some other serious penalty. 314 Where the threats were successful,
the Court has held that such a forced waiver is coerced and therefore
invalid.31 5 Where the threats were unsuccessful, the Court has barred
the state from carrying out its threats. 31 6
In all of these applications of the privilege, there is a link be-
tween the forced disclosure and a potential criminal liability. The
question for our purposes, however, is narrower and more difficult.
May a person invoke the privilege in a civil proceeding even if dis-
closure cannot possibly lead to a criminal prosecution? That is, may
a person invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in a civil pro-
ceeding simply because the nature of the proceeding is itself so pu-
nitive that the individual's forced cooperation implicates the policies
behind the privilege as directly as if it were a criminal case? Is the
privilege necessary in such cases to strike a proper "state-individual
balance" and to avoid the same "cruel trilemma" of choosing be-
tween self-incrimination, perjury, and contempt? 31 7
309. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977).
310. E.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951) (the burden is on one
who challenges the privilege to show it would not have this tendency).
311. See, e.g., SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.R.D. 545, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
312. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976); see infra Part V (discussing
parallel proceedings).
313. Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 805.
314. See id. at 805-06.
315. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967).
316. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83-84 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men
Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 283-84 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392
U.S. 273, 278-79 (1968).
317. See, Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases,
91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1084-87 (1982).
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The Court has faced this issue in a number of cases, with mixed
results. In Boyd v. United States18 the Court recognized the privilege
in a forfeiture proceeding, declaring that "suits for penalties and
forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law,
are ... quasicriminal." 31 9 The Court, while following Boyd in other
cases involving forfeitures, has balked at extending the protection in
civil commitment cases, 320 probation revocation hearings,32' and non-
capital sentencing proceedings. 322
More recently, in United States v. Ward,3 23 the Court concluded
that the privilege did not apply in a proceeding by the government
to impose a 500 dollar penalty against a businessman for discharging
oil into the Arkansas River. The defendant claimed that the gov-
ernment required him, under pain of criminal-like penalties, to report
the spillage. Therefore, he argued, this "coerced" statement could
not be used against him in the penalty proceeding.3 24 Since he already
had been granted immunity from actual criminal prosecution, his
argument could be successful only if the proceeding was deemed
"criminal" for fifth amendment purposes.
In Ward, the Court began its analysis by recognizing that the
protection against self-incrimination is given broader application than
the procedural protections that are applicable only in "criminal pro-
secutions. ' 325 The Court stated, however, that if the purposes of the
318. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
319. Id. at 634.
320. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
321. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984).
322. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (privilege applied in capital sentencing).
323. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
324. Id. at 247, 251.
325. Id. at 248-49. As to whether the proceeding could be deemed criminal in general,
the Court said that the primary determinant had to be congressional intent. Congressional
design would control unless there was "the clearest proof" that "the statutory scheme was
so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." Id. at 248-49 (quoting
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)). In effect, the Court asked whether the
defendant could prove that the statutory proceeding was the functional equivalent of a
criminal proceeding. In so holding, the Court again endorsed the seven factor test of
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 194 (1963), as "helpful." Id. at 249-51. The Ward
Court noted that the fact that the defendant's behavior was also a crime under other
provisions of the statute alone was inadequate to demonstrate functional equivalency to
criminal cases. Id. at 250. Although the Court discussed the case in terms of determining
whether the legislative purpose was sufficiently punitive, it again was clear that for a
proceeding to be deemed criminal for all constitutional purposes, notwithstanding legislative
denomination to the contrary, it must effectively mirror a criminal prosecution in purpose
and effect. In this sense, the Court follows what has been referred to as a "shadow
proceeding" approach. See supra text accompanying notes 189-207.
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proceeding were arguably remedial in natire (that is, if the pro-
ceeding simply resulted in a penalty generally commensurate with the
harm caused by the defendant, and not punitive in nature), then even
given its greater breadth, the self-incrimination clause would not ap-
ply.326 Specifically, the Ward Court found that the genuine remedial
purpose of a penalty that was apportioned according to the harm
done and then donated to a fund to help clean oil spills was not clearly
disproved by evidence of a punitive purpose. 327
The Court has not provided a clear or detailed justification for
the conflicting results of Ward and Boyd. Sometimes it simply has
stated that because a proceeding, like a probation revocation hearing,
is civil, the privilege does not apply.328 In other cases, the Court sim-
ply has accepted that a proceeding can be viewed as "quasi-crimi-
nal"; that is, although not "criminal" enough to trigger other
constitutional protections, it could be "'so far criminal in [its] na-
ture' as to trigger the self-incrimination clause.' '329 In order to attain
quasi-criminal status, however, the person claiming the privilege must
show, by the clearest proof, that the proceeding in question is pu-
nitive in nature-that the state's goals are flatly inconsistent with any
rehabilitative, compensatory, or regulatory aim.330
There may be a more satisfying way to harmonize these con-
tradictory results. A close look at the language used in the forfeiture
case of United States v. United States Coin & Currency provides the
key.331 There the defendant had been convicted of gambling offenses,
and the United States instituted a forfeiture proceeding to obtain the
money used in the crimes. In the forfeiture action, the defendant,
already having been convicted, could not invoke his fifth amendment
privilege on the basis that his answers might lead to future criminal
prosecution. Yet he could still prevail if the Court agreed that the
civil forfeiture proceeding itself was as punitive as a criminal case. 332
The Court so concluded and pointed to two ingredients that make
some civil cases sufficiently like criminal cases to fall within the am-
326. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 253-54.
327. Id.
328. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984) ("Neither, in our view,
would the privilege be available on the ground that answering such questions [regarding
violation of probation conditions] might... result in the termination of probation. Although
a revocation proceeding must comport with the requirements of due process, it is not a
criminal proceeding.").
329. Ward, 448 U.S. at 253-54.
330. Id. at 248-49.
331. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
332. Id. at 718.
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bit of the fifth amendment protection: "When the forfeiture statutes
are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are [1] intended
to impose a penalty [2] only upon those who are significantly in-
volved in a criminal enterprise. '333
Extrapolating from these factors, the following rule emerges: A
person may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in any civil
proceeding where she is accused of having engaged in conduct that
constitutes a crime or a public offense and in which she faces pen-
alties traditionally associated with criminal punishment-that is, fines
or incarceration. 334 This rule is consistent with a long line of cases. 335
As the Court has said:
[T]he guaranty in the 5th Amendment to the Constitution against
compulsory self-incrimination, . . . as this court has held, embraces
proceedings to enforce penalties and forfeitures as well as criminal
prosecutions, and is of broader scope than are the guaranties in
article 3 and the 6th Amendment governing trials in criminal pro-
secutions.3 36
This rule also would be generally consistent with the historical back-
ground of the clause.3 37
Under this test, the privilege would not be applicable to mon-
etary sanctions that are equivalent to recompense (rough remedial
justice). Nor would it apply to probation revocation hearings where
the alleged probation violation is the failure to maintain a job or
some other behavior not itself a crime, nor to an involuntary civil
commitment, so long as it is for treatment and not, in fact, a shadow
criminal proceeding. It would apply, however, to proceedings to ex-
act statutory penalties which, like those in United States v. Halper,338
are grossly disproportionate to the harms caused, to forfeiture ac-
tions aimed at seizing contraband or the proceeds or instrumentalities
of crime, and to pretrial detention hearings. In all of these scenarios,
the imposition of a penalty is triggered by the individual's partici-
333. Id. at 721-22 (footnote omitted).
334. It is settled that a person may not invoke the privilege simply because her response
would be degrading, subject her to scorn, cause mental anguish, betray a nonprivileged
confidence, injure friends, or subject her to civil liability, loss of employment, or disqual-
ification from certain professions. The privilege is available only when the response would
tend to incriminate the individual in a crime or public offense. See Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956) (privilege does not protect witnesses for "loss of job,
expulsion from labor unions, state registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility,
and general public opprobrium"); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896) (answer may
be compelled despite its tendency to disgrace witness or bring him into disrepute).
335. E.g., United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
336. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
337. See L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIrH AMENDMENT 368-432 (2d ed. 1986).
338. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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pation in criminal activity (whether of a de minimis nature, as in
certain forfeiture cases, or not yet proved, as in pretrial detention
cases), and the punishment is of a kind traditionally associated with
criminal proceedings. These, then, are "criminal cases" for the pur-
poses of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. As
in the approach followed in analyzing the excessive fines clause and
the double jeopardy clause, it is the underlying values served by the
constitutional provisions, and not the criminal or civil label attached
to the proceeding in which the matter arises, that determine whether
they are applicable.
V. The Unique Constitutional Problems Presented By
Parallel Proceedings
Even if the constitutional protections against double jeopardy,
excessive fines, and self-incrimination are extended to certain civil
proceedings, the use of civil proceedings to enforce criminal law ob-
jectives raises still other constitutional concerns. Indeed there are
unique constitutional problems that arise simply because defendants
are subject to concurrent civil and criminal proceedings arising out
of the same conduct. This can occur, for example, when the gov-
ernment simultaneously or seriatim pursues a civil action to recover
a statutory penalty or seeks an injunction while it also presses a crim-
inal prosecution. 339
These dual proceedings, often referred to as parallel proceed-
ings, tend to raise three sets of constitutional problems. First, parallel
proceedings can put special pressure on a defendant's fifth amend-
339. There are many types of such supplementary proceedings. Some examples are:
taxpayer suits for refunds during prosecutions for tax fraud; wrongful death damage actions
against persons accused of criminal negligence; actions to require criminal defendants to
forfeit ownership of property used in crime; business or professional license revocation
proceedings resulting from criminal indictments; and civil actions for violations of antitrust
laws, securities laws, banking laws, or laws regulating the use of drugs or cosmetics. Note,
Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Ptrallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 1023, 1023 n.5 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Equitable Powers]; see also Donnici, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Pre-Trial Discovery: The Use of Protective
Orders to Avoid Constitutional Issues, 3 U.S.F. L. REv. 12, 12 (1968-69); Heidt, supra note
317, at 1065 & n.10; Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination In Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24
GA. L. REv. 473 (1990); Pickholz, Parallel Enforcement Proceedings: Guidelines for the
Corporate Lawyer, 7 SEC. REo. L.J. 99 (1979); Note, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings,
24 Am. Cajm. L. Rav. 855 (1987) (authored by Carol E. Longest); Comment, Federal
Discovery in Concurrent Criminal and Civil Proceedings, 52 Tus.. L. REv. 769 (1978)
(authored by Robert B. Mitchell).
ment privilege against self-incrimination.340 For example, even if the
defendant is permitted to invoke the privilege, and does in fact in-
voke it in a civil proceeding,34l she may impair her ability to litigate
the civil claim because she will be denied beneficial use of the evi-
dence.342 Moreover, a civil court may draw an adverse inference from
a party's refusal to testify on fifth amendment grounds.3 43
Second, parallel proceedings can weaken a defendant's due proc-
ess rights because the government, as simultaneous prosecutor and
plaintiff, may benefit from the more generous discovery opportu-
nities afforded by civil proceedings. 3" Sometimes the benefits are
340. See Pollack, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201, 205 (1989).
341. If the defendant fails to invoke her fifth amendment privilege, it will be deemed
waived. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 (1970). Waiver will extend not just to the
civil proceeding, but also to any later criminal proceeding, since the evidence in the civil
case is available for use in the criminal case. Id. at 11-12.
342. See, e.g., SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.R.D. 545, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. Minn. 1968).
343. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). The government also may lose at
this game when the defendant's use of the fifth amendment privilege conceals important
evidence. Donnici, supra note 339, at 15; Heidt, supra note 317, at 1064; Note, Equitable
Powers, supra note 339, at 1024.
A special dilemma arises in forfeiture cases. Because the government need only show
probable cause to initiate a forfeiture proceeding, thereby shifting to the defendant the
burden of proving that the property should not be forfeited, a property owner cannot defend
a forfeiture claim without, in effect, testifying to ownership of the property. Pollack, supra
note 340, at 206.
It should be noted that courts have held that such pressure on the privilege against self-
incrimination does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., United States
v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970); SEC v. Grossman, 121 F.R.D. 207, 210 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Gellis v. Casey, 338 F. Supp. 651, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); In fact it is well accepted
that the mere existence of a parallel proceeding is not a compulsion to testify prohibited by
the fifth amendment. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); United States v. White,
589 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1979); Diebold v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 611 F.2d 697, 701
(8th Cir. 1979).
344. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for "discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b).
In contrast to this generous civil discovery standard, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide for the taking of witnesses' depositions only under "exceptional circum-
stances" when it is "in the interest of justice" that the testimony be preserved for use at
trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a). Furthermore, Rule 15(d) limits the scope of examination to
"such as would be allowed in the trial itself." FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(d)(2). Rule 16 limits
the scope of a defendant's discovery to any relevant statements the defendant has made and
her own prior record. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(B). This Rule gives the defendant
access to reports of physical examinations and tests, documents, and tangible items provided
they are material to the preparation of the defense or are intended to be used by the
government as evidence in the case-in-chief. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(C)-(D). Rule 16
specifically excludes from discovery statements of government witnesses. FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(2). The scope of the government's discovery is limited to the types of material requested
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obtained inadvertently, but there are instances when the government
has brought a civil case as a means of circumventing the limited dis-
covery prescribed in criminal cases.3 45
Finally, parallel proceedings may undercut a defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. This can happen
when the government makes use of civil discovery provisions to gain
access to information normally protected by the attorney-client priv-
ilege.346 Additionally, as one commentator has argued, a defendant's
sixth amendment right to effective counsel can be diluted indirectly
when counsel works so vigorously on the production of materials for
the civil defense that she neglects to consider how this information
can hurt the defendant in a supplementary criminal case.3 47
Without the benefit of legislative guidance, courts have scram-
bled to find solutions to these difficulties. Primarily they have drawn
upon their equitable powers to issue protective orders 348 or orders
staying the civil proceedings. 349 Courts also have relied on less com-
by the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence at trial. FED.
R. CuM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)-(B). See also Comment, Federal Discovery in Concurrent Criminal
and Civil Proceedings, supra note 339, at 770-81 (comparing the scope of discovery permitted
in civil and criminal contexts).
345. See Pollack, supra note 340, at 207. Of course, the government can also be
disadvantaged by such tactics. A criminal defendant can file a civil action against the
government and gain the benefits offered by broad civil discovery provisions while the
criminal case against her is pending.
346. Note, Enforcing Criminal Laws Through Civil Proceedings, supra note 23, at 103 1-
32.
347. Id. at 1032.
348. When a court uses its equitable power to issue a protective order, it can seal civil
court records and bar nonparty access to discovery or trial proceedings. FED. R. CIV. P.
26(c). There are three major problems with this approach. First, sealing the records impinges
on the public interest in open hearings. Second, such an order is subject to modification at
any time, thereby draining confidence in the protections which the order is meant to provide.
Third, use of seals may increase the inefficiency of the court system by increasing the level
of duplicative litigation. See Donnici, supra note 339, at 16; Note, Equitable Powers, supra
note 339, at 1036-38.
349. Rather than sealing civil records, many courts prefer using stays to halt the parallel
civil trial until the completion of the criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Integrated Generics,
Inc. v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); C3, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl.
Ct. 659, 661 (1984). There are numerous benefits to this remedy. By relieving the pressure
on the defendant to testify or produce evidence during a civil proceeding, the court provides
the defendant with less incentive to invoke the fifth amendment in a context where its
invocation would affect adversely the production of evidence in the criminal proceeding.
Once the criminal trial is completed, the defendant will be much more likely to testify fully
in the civil case, knowing that she no longer speaks with the potential for self-incrimination.
Note, Equitable Powers, supra note 339, at 1039-40. Additionally, the discovery obtained
in the criminal trial may be used safely in a subsequent civil trial without impairing the
defendant's constitutional rights. Finally, a stay of the civil proceedings pending completion
of the criminal trial may encourage settlements, since the outcome of the criminal case
prehensive solutions, such as quashing or modifying subpoenas"50 or
limiting the scope of discovery with respect to particular matters. 5'
In many cases, a court's ad hoc use of these devices to adjust
and tailor solutions to particular problems promotes fairness and
protects the defendant's interests. Nevertheless, the absence of gen-
eral rules makes such a process unreliable and the application of such
principles uneven. With this in mind, some courts have fashioned
guidelines to determine when a stay of proceedings should be or-
dered. In order for these guidelines to apply, there usually must exist
'special circumstances' in which the nature of the proceedings de-
monstrably prejudices substantial rights of the investigated party or
of the government. 35 2 Whether "special circumstances" exist de-
pends on a number of factors: (1) the private interest of the plaintiffs
balanced against the prejudice to the plaintiffs if the proceedings are
delayed; (2) the private interest of and burden to the defendants; (3)
the convenience of the courts; (4) the interest of persons not parties
to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest.353
Courts also have developed some rules of thumb regarding stays-
such as, the greater the commonality of issues, the greater the need
for a stay.354 Or they will consider the stage of the criminal pro-
ceedings, tending to grant stays only when such proceedings have
begun. 355 Moreover, in weighing the equities, courts will consider
would give the parties a clear idea of the potential outcome of the civil proceeding. On the
other hand, the delay of the civil proceeding that would result from a stay diminishes the
efficiency of the courts and does nothing to guarantee the parties a speedy resolution of
their civil complaints.
Modified versions of the stay may prove particularly useful. "Tailoring" the stay, that
is, fashioning an order that directly responds to and balances each party's concerns, helps
judicial efficiency and reduces the burden on both parties while still affording the defendant
some protection from the bias inherent in simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings. See
SEC v. Chestman, 861 F.2d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1988) (allowing the government to permissibly
intervene in a civil case for the sole purpose of staying discovery pending the outcome of
a parallel criminal investigation).
350. See, e.g., United States v. Steffes, 35 F.R.D. 24, 27 (D. Mont. 1964) (granting
government's motion to quash subpoenas issued for the taking of discovery depositions by
party defending in civil and criminal proceedings).
351. See, e.g., United States v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 661 F.2d 847, 851 (10th Cir.
1981) (finding limited discovery appropriate in tax investigation where criminal and civil
elements are intertwined); Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc.,
87 F.R.D. 53, 58-59 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (limiting discovery by plaintiffs in civil antitrust action
pending termination of criminal antitrust proceedings against defendant).
352. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1970)).
353. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 92 F.R.D. 358, 359-60 (D. Md. 1981).
354. See, e.g., United States v. Mellon Bank, 545 F.2d 869, 873 (3d Cir. 1976).
355. See, e.g., Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1375-76.
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whether the movant has requested a stay solely to create an imped-
iment to the disclosure of otherwise valid evidence.3 56
Nevertheless because stays are discretionary and granted on a
case-by-case basis, the government is more likely to receive relief from
the problems caused by parallel proceedings than is an individual.
For example, a defendant's motion to stay civil proceedings on the
grounds of due process will fail if the government can show a le-
gitimate reason for bringing the supplementary civil case.3517 Even
where the more liberal civil discovery rules provide the government
with evidence it could not have obtained in a criminal proceeding,
as long as there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the gov-
ernment, the court is unlikely to grant a stay of the civil proceed-
ings. 358 To obtain a stay of civil proceedings on due process grounds,
the defendant usually must demonstrate "special circumstances";
that is, that the civil case purposefully was brought to bypass the
more limited criminal discovery guidelines. 359
The government, on the other hand, has much greater success
in obtaining stays or orders to defer the production of evidence in
response to the defendant's request for discovery materials. The gov-
ernment's motions to stay tend to succeed on the grounds that dis-
closure might jeopardize ongoing criminal investigations or
prosecutions.360 Moreover, the Department of Justice invariably is
successful in obtaining a stay if it shows that the defendant is at-
tempting to circumvent criminal discovery rules by availing herself
of the more liberal civil discovery procedures.3 6'
Because law enforcement authorities are relying more heavily on
civil proceedings as part of their systematic efforts to fight crime,
the constitutional pressures generated by parallel proceedings are likely
356. See Arden Way Assocs. v. Boesky, 660 F. Supp. 1494, 1498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
357. See, e.g., Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1377 (allowing parallel SEC and Justice Department
proceedings for securities laws violations).
358. Where the government has the statutory authority to conduct investigations with a
view to both civil and criminal proceedings-as does the SEC, for example-a defendant's
attempts to receive a stay of the civil proceedings are unlikely to succeed. See Dresser, 628
F.2d at 1376-77; see also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970).
359. Hearne v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 362, 370 (1985).
360. See, e.g., First Merchants Enter. v. Shannon, 1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,421 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (where a deposition was withheld); Integrated Generics, Inc. v.
Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (where an entire civil proceeding was subject
to a stay); FDIC v. Kuang Hsung Chuang, 85 Civ. 7468 (SWK), 1986 WESTLAW 3518, *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1986) (where the court granted a stay of all discovery by defendants in
a civil action to protect a concurrent criminal investigation).
361. See, e.g., Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963); Founding Church of Scientology v. Kelley, 77 F.R.D. 378 (D.C.D.C. 1977);
United States v. One 1964 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 41 F.R.D. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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to increase. Generic solutions are possible. They include: legislative
adoption of automatic stays of all civil proceedings if criminal charges
are pending or imminent; adoption and implementation of rules re-
quiring the government to make an election of remedies in certain
kinds of cases;3 62 or experimentation with unitary civil-criminal pro-
ceedings, having perhaps bifurcated or phased consideration of is-
sues. At the moment, dual procedural systems simply are not designed
to accommodate new law enforcement strategies and, at the same
time, assure complete constitutional protections for the defendant.
VI. Reining in the Abuses of Civil Proceedings-The
Protections of Due Process of Law
At bottom, many of the objections lodged against using civil
remedies to complement criminal law enforcement rest on claims of
unfairness, irrationality, and government overreaching. Given the
narrow definition of what is a criminal proceeding and the inap-
plicability of certain constitutional procedures to civil proceedings,
it is vital that remedies be disciplined by rigorous civil law due proc-
ess protections.
Unfortunately, perhaps because so much seems settled once a
court decides that a particular proceeding is not a criminal one, the
courts have not been particularly vigorous in identifying and pre-
venting unfairness in the imposition of civil penalties. Frequently,
due process challenges have been turned away in opinions that have
a wooden and formulaic cast-the antithesis of the vigilant, flexible,
and equitable spirit of due process of law.
In ordinary civil suits, for example, procedural due process re-
quirements are satisfied under the interest balancing approach of Ma-
thews v. Eldridge,3 63 which requires notice, an opportunity to be heard,
and such other procedures as will ensure an accurate and rational
action.364 Ordinarily this means a predeprivation hearing, allocation
of the evidentiary burden to the moving party, a preponderance stan-
dard for the burden of proof, and no right to appointment of coun-
sel.365 Civil proceedings that work in tandem with the criminal laws,
362. This may be the practical effect of extending double jeopardy rules to civil pro-
ceedings.
363. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
364. Id. at 333-34.
365. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.8, at 484 (3d
ed. 1986). The frequently stated essentials of civil procedural due process are: (1) adequate
notice of the charges or basis for government action; (2) a neutral decision-maker; (3) an
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however, include novel remedies: double and treble damage awards,
magnificent forfeitures, branding of persons as "racketeers" or
"unfit," and summary seizures of property. The enormity of the
impact of these "new penalties" calls into question whether the or-
dinary civil due process formulae adequately fulfill the constitutional
promises. The Supreme Court already has demonstrated that, when
the stakes are high enough, due process may mean according civil
defendants more stringent procedural protections, sometimes even
protections akin to those found in criminal cases. Thus, in In re
Gault,366 the Court elevated the preponderance standard of proof to
that of clear and convincing evidence, 367 and in Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services,36 it stated that appointment of counsel may
sometimes be required in civil cases.3 69
Commentators have taken aim at the new penalties, primarily
on procedural due process grounds. Civil forfeitures and civil RICO
are recurring candidates in calls for recalibrating the civil due process
calculus. Commentators have condemned summary exparte seizures
in civil forfeitures, 370 the burden of proof rules applicable in civil
RICO suits, 37' and the denial of appointment of counsel in various
settings .372
Courts have not been sympathetic. For example, they have re-
jected: raising the burden of proof in civil RICO cases, 373 pleas for
opportunity to make oral presentation to the decision-maker; (4) an opportunity to present
evidence or witnesses to the decision-maker; (5) a chance to confront and cross-examine
witnesses or evidence to be used against the individual; (6) the right to have an attorney
present the individual's case to the decision-maker (if one is retained) and (7) a decision
based on the record with statement of reasons for the decision. Id.
366. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (reversing determination of juvenile delinquency for lack of
procedural due process).
367. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (considering due process rights of parents in proceedings to
terminate parent-child relationship).
368. Id. at 55.
369. Id. at 32; see also Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
370. See, e.g., Hettinger, Due Process in Preliminary Proceedings Under RICO and
CCE, 83 COLUM. L. RPv. 2068 (1983); Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, "Forfeitable
Interests," and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. Rnv. 57 (1983).
371. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for Further
Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1254.
372. See, e.g., Jackson, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: The Due Process
Right to Appointed Counsel Left Hanging Uneasily in the Mathews v. Eldridge Balance, 8
N. KY. L. Rav. 513 (1981); Rosenberg, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 390 (1988).
373. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Local
560 of The Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985). Civil RICO permits
plaintiffs to recover treble damages against defendants who harm them through engaging in
a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988). Proving a "pattern of racketeering
appointment of counsel in civil forfeiture, 374 and conflict of interest
activity" requires proving the commission of at least two criminal racketeering acts, ranging
from murder and kidnapping to mail fraud. Id. § 1961. The most commonly relied on
criminal act is fraud. See Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 832.
Plaintiffs can recover attorneys fees, and they enjoy generous procedural benefits, such
as liberal venue and joinder rules as well as the full benefits of civil discovery. Civil RICO
has been praised as an effective way to combat and deter widespread business fraud and as
an efficient means of affording redress to victims of criminal activity. Id. at 834-36. It also
has been criticized as an invitation to extort claims and as an unconstitutional imposition
of criminal sanctions on defendants. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 506
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lacovara, Wright & Aronow, Legislative Reform of Civil
RICO: The Business Community's Perspective, in CIVIL RICO LITIGATION, 237, 240-41 (1985)
("The mere threat of a private RICO suit produces settlements because of the risk of treble
damages, attorney's fees, expensive discovery, and the public label "racketeer."); Note,
Civil RICO is a Misnomer, supra note 22, at 1303-06. But both supporters and critics
occasionally have agreed that it is desirable to change the burden of proof in such actions
from a simple preponderance to a clear and convincing standard. Compare Goldsmith, supra
note 10, at 870-71, with Note, The Standard of Proof in Civil RICO Actions for Treble
Damages: Why the Clear and Convincing Standard Should Apply, 22 IND. L. REv. 881,
889 (1989) (authored by Christopher M. Maine). The agreement proceeds from the recognition
that the stakes are higher in a civil RICO action than they are in a conventional civil
lawsuit.
Establishing the appropriate burden of persuasion determines how the "risk of error will
be allocated." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982). In general, the courts recognize
three different burdens of persuasion: proof beyond a reasonable doubt, proof by clear and
convincing evidence and, proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979). In criminal cases the risk of an erroneous verdict is
placed squarely on the state with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. This is because
the defendant's liberty is at risk and society fundamentally prefers that the innocent not be
convicted even if some who are guilty go free. In ordinary civil suits involving money
damages and property rights, a light burden is placed on the plaintiff to prove his case by
a preponderance of the evidence. This is because the plaintiff and defendant are equally at
risk-the plaintiff for the harms alleged and the defendant for the amount sought to be
recovered-and "society has a minimal concern over the outcome." Id. at 423.
In civil RICO actions, the defendant risks not merely compensation but treble damages,
attorneys fees, and the label of a racketeer. These risks have led commentators to argue
that the clear and convincing standard constitutionally is required. To date, however, the
courts remain unsympathetic. See, e.g., Local 560, 780 F.2d 267. The matter was faced
squarely in Liquid Air Corp., 834 F.2d 1297. There, the court rejected the higher standard,
distinguishing cases that had applied it when interests more important than money were at
stake. Id. at 1303. It likened RICO actions to securities fraud cases and proceedings brought
under other federal enforcement statutes. Id.
374. Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985). In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), was
the first civil case in which the Supreme Court found a due process right to appointed
counsel. The case can be distinguished from other civil cases as part of the general
constitutionalization of juvenile proceedings, although it did raise the possibility that a right
to counsel could be found in a civil context. In a subsequent case, however, although not
completely foreclosing the possibility of a right to counsel in civil cases, the Court explained
that there was a presumption against such a right when liberty interests were not at stake.
Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981); see Jackson, supra note 372,
at 513. The Resek court is the only one to consider a right to counsel claim in a forfeiture
case, and the court rejected it. See Resek, 706 P.2d at 291-92.
It is unlikely that any court will order the appointment of counsel in civil RICO forfeiture
or monetary penalty cases of any kind. Even where a stigma is associated with the imposition
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challenges to victims serving as prosecutors in civil contempt cases. 375
Perhaps the best candidate for stringent application of due proc-
ess protections is civil forfeiture. Civil forfeiture has been described
aptly as "a farrago of injustices sanctified by tradition.' '376 The prac-
tices followed in seizing a person's assets frequently fall below even
ordinary due process requirements of prior notice, opportunity to be
heard, and burden of proof rules. Indeed, in some cases forfeiture
may even violate the substantive due process minimum of rationality.
Under certain forfeiture statutes, property that fits within ex-
pansively defined categories of contraband or instrumentalities and
proceeds of crime may be seized summarily and without notice.3 77
Property within these categories is subject to seizure even if the owner
is wholly innocent of crime and is without knowledge of the pro-
perty's illegal use or origin. 378 Although there is usually a requirement
that the seizing officer have probable cause to believe that the prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture, 379 the probable cause determination need
not have a judicial imprimatur or be accompanied by the issuance
of a warrant. 380 Moreover, once the government has established prob-
able cause to believe property is subject to forfeiture, the burden falls
on the property owner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the property is not subject to forfeiture.38 1 Although there is
usually a requirement of a prompt post-seizure hearing where sum-
mary seizure has occurred, lengthy delays often occur.3 12 Indeed, if
of the remedy, as there undoubtedly is in these cases, and even though there is a punitive
quality to the remedy, courts have not required appointment of counsel except in instances
involving potential loss of basic liberties-either the loss of physical liberty via involuntary
commitment or pretrial detention, or the loss suffered from the severing of a fundamental
relationship like that of parent and child.
375. Castellanos v. Novoa, No. IF-858-87, mem. op. at 13 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 27,
1989); see infra Part VII. B.
376. Fried, supra note 4, at 331.
377. See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
378. See id.
379. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1982 Supp. IV) (Controlled Substances Act).
380. Id. § 881(b)(4) (1988); see United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643
F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
381. Litigants sometimes have complained about this shift in the burden of proof, at
odds with ordinary civil practice, claiming that it is unfair or violates procedural due process.
See, e.g., United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., Livonia,
889 F.2d 1258, 1267-68, 1290 (2d Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (1990); United
States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1162 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
$2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1099 (1984). The courts have shrugged off these objections, noting specific statutory intent
to apply, or time-out-of mind, historical acceptance of, this burden-shifting of in rem
practice. Livonia, 889 F.2d at 1267-68. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,
254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921); Reed & Gill, supra note 370, at 62-67.
382. E.g., In re United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars
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the government is seeking in personam forfeiture from a criminal
defendant, an innocent third party may have to wait until the out-
come of the criminal case, months or even years later, to be heard
on her claim that the forfeiture is wrongful. 83
The courts have found substantial fault with the application of
civil forfeitures in particular cases and have struck down various pro-
visions as unconstitutional. 8 4 No court, however, has taken the novel
and perhaps needed step of viewing civil forfeitures as substantively
and procedurally unconstitutional because of their cumulative, ag-
gregate unfairness. Yet it is the overall operation of civil forfeiture
that most belies its inequity.3"5
Critique of forfeiture practice is already well-trod ground, 3 6 but
it is instructive to take a look at two particular due process lapses,
($8,850) in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) (18 month delay between govern-
ment's seizure and its filing of a petition for civil forfeiture); Application of Kingsley, 802
F.2d 571, 572-73 (1st Cir. 1986).
383. 18 U.S.C. § 19630) (Supp. III 1982); 21 U.S.C. § 853(k) (1989); see United States
v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (provision declared unconstitutional as
violative of due process).
384. E.g., Livonia, 889 F.2d at 1262-65.
385. See Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 768 (1977) (authored by James R. Maxeiner) [hereinafter Note, Bane of American
Forfeiture Law].
386. A due process issue that has yet to be fully aired is the unfairness that may infect
forfeiture regimes that permit law enforcement authorities to keep the property they seize.
By giving law enforcement a direct interest in aggressive forfeiture, such arrangements may
distort police investigatory practices and prosecutors' charging decisions, as well as introduce
an adversary element between the government and third parties who have an interest in
seized property. At a minimum, they create an appearance of unfairness and invite over-
reaching. See Fried supra note 4, at 365-66.
In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), the Supreme Court invalidated an Ohio procedure
under which half of all criminal fines imposed by the Mayor sitting as judge went to the
township and to the Mayor for his costs. Although there was no evidence that the Mayor
had been influenced by this arrangement, the Court found it unconstitutional because it
created a "possible temptation to the average man as a judge." Id. at 532. Similarly, in
other cases where a judge's interest was found to be "direct personal, substantial, [and]
pecuniary" the judge's decision in the case violated due process. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986). Of course, neither a police officer nor a prosecutor
judges; they initiate action, but do not pass final judgment. That, at least, is the theory.
The reality can be quite different. A police officer and a prosecutor exercise considerable
discretion when deciding whether or not to arrest, to charge, and to prosecute. Each may
have the further discretion to compromise forfeiture claims by accepting payment in return
for seized property. In some instances, the whole arrangement has about it the air of "let's
make a deal." See Strasser, supra note 92, at col. 1.
Because of the way asset forfeiture paybacks work, the Supreme Court's decision in
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980), should not foreclose bias claims along due
process lines. In Jerrico the Court relied on the fundamental distinction between the different
roles a prosecutor and judge play and refused to set aside civil penalties assessed by an
administrative official. The law under which the penalties were assessed, the Fair Labor
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namely, summary exparte seizure and the seizure of property of in-
nocent owners.
A. In Rem Summary Seizures
Procedural due process ordinarily contemplates notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a property in-
terest.387 Sometimes, however, notice and opportunity to be heard
can be postponed until after the seizure is effected. 388 Such a relax-
ation of the ordinary rule requires an "extraordinary situation" and
a "special need for very prompt action.' '389 In Fuentes v. Shevin, 390
the Court identified three criteria for the exceptional case:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State
has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the
person initiating the seizure has been a government official re-
sponsible for determining under the standards of a narrowly drawn
statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular in-
stance. 91
In applying these rules to civil forfeitures, the courts have ac-
knowledged that only extraordinary circumstances can justify sum-
mary seizures. 392 At the same time, however, they have found that
the moveable quality of property subject to forfeiture is an extraor-
dinary circumstance. 393 Thus, statutes permit, and the courts have
sanctioned, the summary seizure of moveable goods if there is prob-
able cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture, 394 and
Standards Act, permitted sums collected as civil penalties to be returned to the administrative
agency as reimbursement for its costs of litigating. The Court, however, principally paid
attention to the actual operation of the reimbursement scheme and concluded that the
possibility that reimbursement would influence the administrator's decision was "exception-
ally remote," there -being no "realistic possibility" of distortion of judgment. Id. at 250-
51. The same kind of conclusion could not necessarily be reached in the forfeiture payback
arrangements.
387. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-
68 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
388. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
389. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-91.
390. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
391. Id. at 91.
392. But see United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (lth Cir.
1986) (viewing seizure for purposes of forfeiture, without more, to be an extraordinary
situation).
393. E.g., United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in
United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) (seizure of currency).
394. There is, however, some controversy about the precise way in which probable cause
must be established.
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if there is a procedural mechanism for a prompt post-seizure
hearing.3 95 The Supreme Court, for example, validated the summary
seizure of a yacht under Puerto Rico's drug forfeiture laws by saying
that, procedurally speaking, "this case presents an 'extraordinary'
situation in which postponement of notice and hearing until after
seizure did not deny due process. ' 3 96 Further, the Court has noted
that "It]he property seized-as here, a yacht-will often be of a sort
that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or con-
cealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given." 3 97
Courts have questioned, however, whether a seizure of real es-
tate can ever be procedurally proper without first affording the prop-
erty owner notice and an opportunity to be heard.3 98 Not only is real
property not readily moved or subject to being dissipated but, where
the real property is an individual's home, values of privacy and free-
dom from governmental intrusion are also at stake. As one court
noted, the government's interest in preventing real property from
being improperly transferred can be satisfied readily by the filing of
a lis pendens along with a restraining order or bond requirement.3 99
A particularly stark example of real property forfeiture, gov-
ernment overreaching, and the need for procedural protection is pro-
vided by In Re Application of Kingsley.400 On the basis of a secret
affidavit, Kingsley was dispossessed of his home and all of his per-
sonal belongings, including his pets and food. The government al-
leged, on information and belief, that Kingsley was a veteran cocaine
dealer and that all of his property was subject to seizure as proceeds
of his criminal business.40 1 Despite Kingsley's attempt to challenge
the action, the government did not file an application for civil
forfeiture 402 and no hearing was held until almost fifty days later. 4 3
The government did not file a criminal complaint, on which seizure
of the house was predicated, until seven months after the original
allegations .404
395. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
396. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1974).
397. Id. at 679.
398. United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, Livonia,
889 F.2d 1258, 1263 (2d Cir. 1989); reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (1990); United States v. A
Leasehold Interest in Property Located at 850 South Maple, 743 F. Supp. 505, 509 (E.D.
Mich. 1990); United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway,
612 F. Supp. 1492, 1495-96 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
399. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1265.
400. 802 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1986).
401. Id. at 572.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 574.
404. Id. at 576.
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B. The Irrationality of Certain Forfeitures as Applied to Innocent
Owners
When government action is challenged under substantive due
process, the outcome ordinarily depends on whether a court applies
a vigorous strict scrutiny standard or an easily satisfied rational basis
review. Social and economic legislation that does not interfere with
specific "fundamental rights," such as rights to raise children, use
contraceptives, or marry and divorce, is judged under the lenient
rational basis test. That is, the law is presumed constitutional, and
if it rationally serves any permissible police power objective (public
health, convenience, morals), it will be upheld. 40 5 Thus, legislatures,
when not acting to affect fundamental rights, constitutionally are
permitted to make all rational choices about how society will be or-
dered. They are free to decide what conduct will be criminal, what
activities will be taxed, and what behavior will be regulated.
As a result, there is ordinarily no meaningful substantive due
process basis upon which to attack the use of civil remedies to con-
trol, sanction, or regulate antisocial behavior. For example, legis-
latures rationally may conclude that the integrity of the tax system
requires monetary fines for late payments, or they rationally may
adopt a measure making the possession of dangerous drugs illegal
and providing for seizure and forfeiture.
In rare cases, however, a civil remedy might operate so dispro-
portionately or be applied so irrationally that even this substantive
due process standard could impose a limit. Forfeiture and some reg-
ulatory sanctions may be potential candidates for this restraint. 40 6
405. See, e.g., J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4 (3d
ed. 1986).
406. For example, the Supreme Court has left open the possibility that an irrational
exclusion of a person from an occupation will violate substantive due process. Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (violation of due process to deny admission
to bar of individual based on prior membership in the Communist Party). Although the
legislature is shown great deference, it may not simply decree that conviction of this, that,
or the other crime will bar an individual from professions or opportunities which the state
regulates. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (upholding suspension of a
physician's license for conviction of a crime); id. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). State
qualifications and disqualifications "must have a rational connection with the applicant's
fitness or capacity" to engage in the profession or occupation. Schware, 353 U.S. at 239.
Thus, a statute that made a drug conviction an automatic bar to all federal employment
would violate due process and would constitute a bill of attainder. In the current "war on
drugs" it would not be hard to imagine the passage of such a statute.
Another irrationality challenge could rest on the gross disproportionality between amounts
subject to forfeiture and the crime to which the property was related. No court has invalidated
forfeiture solely because the amount forfeited was grossly disproportionate to the underlying
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The Supreme Court consistently has held that forfeiture laws do
not violate due process simply because they are made applicable to
property interests of innocent owners. 40 7 This makes sense if the for-
feited property is contraband because, by definition, contraband may
not be owned or possessed: the nature of the item itself indicates
guilt.4 8 Forfeitures applied to innocent owners also may be reason-
able if the property in question is traceable proceeds of a crime, even
if such proceeds now rest in the hands of an unknowing third party.
This conclusion can be justified by the argument that, as between
the harm to the innocent party and closing off avenues for criminals
to launder their gain, a legislature may choose to frustrate the crim-
inal. Moreover, a third party, such as a lawyer, is sometimes in a
position to consider whether the property she has received was trans-
ferred by a known or suspected criminal. The Supreme Court spe-
cifically has rejected arguments that due process prevents the forfeiture
of attorneys fees paid by criminals and traceable as proceeds of a
RICO violation. 4°9
Forfeitures applied to innocent persons whose property is used
as an instrumentality of a crime, however, may be irrational under
offense to which it was connected. Perversely, some courts even have held that the gross
disproportionality supports constitutionality because it makes clear that the forfeiture is
designed as a civil, as opposed to criminal, remedy. See, e.g., Resek v. Alaska, 706 P.2d
288 (Alaska 1985). Gross disproportionality shows "the absence of any correlation between
the culpability of the property owner and the size of the penalty." Id. at 292. Yet, there is
some disquiet. In several cases, courts have expressed doubts about expansive applications
of forfeiture laws and the resulting gross disproportionality between the underlying offense
and the amounts seized. See Fried, supra note 4, at 384-96.
407. E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974).
408. Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law, supra note 385, at 784.
409. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1989). The Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 853, makes forfeitable all proceeds and property derived
from proceeds that the defendant obtained from racketeering or continuing criminal enter-
prise drug activities. The statute creates a governmental right in such proceeds from the
time of the commission of the offense. A third person who claims a right in the property
that is subject to forfeiture must establish either that she had a superior right in the property
before the defendant committed the crime, or that she was a bona fide purchaser for value
and was at the time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 853(u)(6) (1989). For commentary on the issue of forfeiture
of attorneys' fees, see Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional
Role Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1; Note, Against
Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO: Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminal
Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 124 (1986) (authored by Lisa F. Rackner); Note, Forfeiture
of Attorneys' Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys"
with the "Fruits of the Crime"?, 39 STAN. L. REv. 663 (1987) (authored by Richard W.
Mass); Note, Forfeitability of Attorney's Fees Traceable as Proceeds From a RICO Violation
Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 32 WAYNE L. REv. 1499 (1986)
(authored by Calvin Sterk).
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due process analysis. The Supreme Court itself implicitly recognized
this prospect in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 410 In
that case, the Court upheld the civil forfeiture of a yacht because
a single marijuana cigarette was recovered on board. The yacht was
being used by tenants under a long term lease and the owner-lessor
was innocent of any involvement with or even knowledge of the
drugs. 411 The Court stated that laws permitting in rem forfeitures of
innocents' property are justified by their "punitive and deterrent pur-
poses. ' 412 Although presumably there would be no basis to punish
the innocent lessor, the Court noted that on the facts of this case
"confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing them to ex-
ercise greater care in transferring possession of their property.1 41 3
The lessor in Calero, having offered no evidence as to his degree of
care, forfeited the yacht. 41 4 The significance of Calero lies in the
Court's dictum that:
It would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner
... who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware
of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that rea-
sonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his prop-
erty; for in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that
forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppres-
sive. 411
Although courts have relied on this dictum, Calero's implication
that certain extreme and arbitrary forfeitures of property will violate
fundamental fairness has had little practical significance. There are
two explanations for this fact. First, many statutes permit "inno-
cent" owners to seek remission of their property.416 Second, and more
disappointingly, courts have applied a very narrow meaning to in-
nocence or reasonable care. For example, courts have found lack of
reasonable care when a parent loaned the family car to a son who
had a minor criminal record. 417 When the son later used the car to
410. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
411. Id. at 668.
412. Id. at 686.
413. Id. at 688.
414. Id. at 690.
415. Id. at 689-90 (footnote omitted).
416. See Regulations Governing the Remission or Mitigation of Civil and Criminal
Forfeitures, 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.7 (1990). Remission is available if petitioner "had no
knowledge that the property in which petitioner claims an interest was or would be involved
in any violation of the law." Id. § 9.5. However, a "lessor who leases property on a long
term basis with the right to sublease shall not be entitled to remission or mitigation of a
forfeiture of such property unless the lessee would be entitled to such relief." 28 C.F.R. §§
9.5(b)(2); 9.6(c)(2).
417. United States v. One 1978 Chrysler Le Baron Station Wagon, 648 F. Supp. 1048,
1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
transport drugs, the car was forfeited. 418 Forfeiture of "instrumen-
talities" owned by innocent persons thus retains an air of happen-
stance and superstition 4 9 about it-a little like lightning striking. 420
VII. A Case in Context: Civil Protection Orders and
Criminal Contempt
Having clarified the distinction between criminal and civil pro-
ceedings and outlined the constitutional issues that surround the com-
bined use of civil and criminal remedies, we can now identify more
precisely the constitutional weaknesses of particular criminal-civil
hybrids. One such combination remedy is the use of injunctive relief
and criminal contempt sanctions against domestic violence. 42'
Most states authorize victims of domestic violence to apply for
a civil protection order (CPO) that enjoins an abuser from com-
mitting further acts of violence and abuse.422 CPO's also may require
the abuser to leave her residence, seek treatment for her abusive be-
havior, and limit child visitation or rescind custody. 423 Using CPO's
418. Id.
419. See Fried, supra note 4, at 388; see also J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921).
420. See United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Continental Mark IV, 578 F. Supp. 402
(S.D.W. Va. 1984). See generally, United States v. A Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp.
783, 786 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (dictum) (courts routinely uphold the civil forfeiture of a loaned
vehicle used to facilitate a drug transaction against claims of the innocent owner exemption);
United States v. One Rockwell Int'l Commander 690 C/840, 594 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.D.
1984) (civil forfeiture proper when innocent owner of airplane leased it without any "plan
or procedures for detecting smuggling"), rev'd, 754 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding
that the common carrier was exempt from forfeiture because there was no privity or consent
to the transportation of illegal drugs).
421. There are many statutes, state and federal, that specifically provide for injunctive
relief against behavior which might also, but not necessarily, be classified as criminal. For
example, there are statutes regulating fraudulent and deceptive trade practices, antitrust
violations, securities transactions, pollution-causing activities, and civil rights violations.
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1988) (permitting Securities and Exchange Commission to seek
injunction to remedy fraudulent practices in the offer or sale of securities); 33 U.S.C. §
1319(b) (1988) (authorizing the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to
seek injunction for violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C. §
6928(a)(1) (1988) (providing for injunctive relief for violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act). For years the SEC has relied on a variety of civil sanctions for the enforcement
of SEC rules, particularly insider trading prohibitions. Its principal weapon has been an
injunction against future violations and for disgorgement of profits. Other equitable en-
forcement remedies include forcing the defendant to provide information or rectify misleading
statements.
422. All states except Arkansas and New Mexico have civil protection order statutes.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (Supp. 1991).
423. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1990); see Lerman, A Model State
Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HAiv. J. ON LEoIs. 61, 106-14 (1984).
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to combat domestic violence anticipates a two-step process. First the
civil protection order is sought. Because this part of the process is
civil in nature, civil procedural protections apply. This ordinarily
means proof by a preponderance of the evidence424 and other con-
ventional civil proceeding rules, though jurisdictions may opt for
heightened procedural requirements such as proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence 425 or appointment of counsel.426 Most jurisdictions
permit a court to award immediate and temporary ex parte relief in
emergencies .427
The second step in the CPO regime is enforcement. Once a CPO
is obtained and served on an abuser, violation of the order is a crime,
enforced either by contempt proceedings or ordinary criminal proc-
ess. 428 Although some courts have concluded erroneously that minor
punishments for violating a court order (five day sentences imposed
on enjoined gang members) are a form of civil contempt, it is clear
that any determinate contempt sentence is criminal in nature. 429 It
follows that, in these instances, all of the procedural protections ap-
plicable to criminal cases must be honored. 410
Since punishing the violation of a civil protection order via crim-
inal contempt is a criminal proceeding complete with all constitu-
tional criminal procedural protections for the accused, the question
arises: why use civil protection orders at all? Why not simply rely
on criminal prosecution for the underlying behavior?
There are many reasons. First, the very process of getting a civil
protection order serves notice on the offender that her conduct is in
question, that the courts are involved, and that serious consequences
may ensue if she keeps up her present behavior. This by itself may
deter future abuse. A CPO also can be an alternative to prosecution
where, although criminal conduct plainly may be involved, the matter
presents difficult proof problems, the victim is tentative about pros-
ecution, or other facts-such as higher prosecution priorities-render
prosecution impracticable or unlikely.
Second, a civil protection order can be sought, indeed may have
to be sought, by the victim. In jurisdictions where the prosecutor is
424. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANr. § 403.750(1) (Michie 1984); N.Y. JUD. LAw § 832
(McKinney 1983).
425. E.g., MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(d)(2) (Supp. 1989).
426. E.g., Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-103(e) (Michie 1977).
427. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 107.700 - 730 (1989). Such relief can even include eviction
of the offender from the home. E.g., WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.070 (Supp. 1991).
428. See Lerman, supra note 423, at 117, 122-23.
429. See supra Part III.C.
430. Id.
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unwilling to proceed against a batterer and where private citizens are
prevented from initiating criminal actions, this option offers a self-
help alternative. Third, once a civil protection order is entered, vi-
olation thereof triggers arrest. Fourth, the use of a civil protection
order permits the court, in fashioning the precise terms of the order,
to proscribe conduct-under pain of criminal punishment-that in
itself is not a crime. For example, some civil protection orders direct
the abuser to vacate her home, 431 have no contact with the victim, 43 2
or stay off certain property. 433
In delineating these "advantages" and taking a close look at
how civil protection orders actually operate-as opposed to simply
assessing whether they are criminal or civil in nature-we can distill
three particular constitutional weaknesses that attend their use. 434
A. The Scope of a Civil Protection Order
As with other civil penalty regimes, parties have complained that
CPO practice deprives them of procedural due process. Parties have
challenged ex parte relief,435 the preponderance standard of proof,436
and the absence of appointed counsel.43 7 Courts repeatedly have re-
buffed these complaints. Applying the due process balancing formula
of Mathews v. Eldridge438-weighing the interests affected, the risk
of error under existing practices, and the public interest-courts in-
variably have found that conventional civil procedural rules were
constitutionally adequate. 439 Viewed in isolation, these results are nei-
431. Almost all domestic abuse protection order statutes permit eviction of the offender
from the home. See Lerman, supra note 423, at 106; see e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-
1-16 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
432. E.g., VA. CODE § 16.1-253.1(A)(3) (1988).
433. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(c) (West 1985).
434. Of course, like any law, a law enforced through an injunction is subject to a due
process vagueness challenge if the words of the statute fail to give fair warning to a person
of ordinary intelligence of what is proscribed. Furthermore, if the law inhibits protected
free expression, unduly burdens or prohibits associational ties, or intrudes into protected
privacy spheres, it may run afoul of the first and fourteenth amendments. Obviously a
legislature cannot authorize courts to infringe on protected freedoms via injunctions any
more than it can affect those rights directly through legislation.
435. See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982).
436. In the analogous area of protective orders used to prevent interference with civil
rights, Massachusetts courts have held squarely that the preponderance standard is all that
is required in a proceeding to obtain an order. Commonwealth v. Guilfoyle, 402 Mass. 130,
162, 521 N.E. 2d 984, 987 (1988).
437. Cloutterbuck v. Cloutterbuck, 556 A.2d 1082 (D.C. Ct. App. 1989).
438. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
439. E.g., State ex rel Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982) (holding that ex
parte order provisions of Missouri Adult Abuse Act satisfied due process requirements);
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ther surprising nor necessarily mistaken. Yet they do exacerbate what
may be the most serious flaw in CPO remedies: namely, the per-
missible scope of the orders that may be entered.
Many CPO statutes permit courts to enter orders restraining a
party from committing acts that are criminal offenses, such as as-
sault, theft, or threats.440 But, as indicated, these statutes often pro-
scribe acts that are not criminal. Since the court, in effect, is creating
criminal offenses by the terms of the order-creating essentially per-
sonal criminal codes, if you will-not only must the order survive
the requirements of specificity and clarity that apply to criminal sta-
tutes, but it also must be within the court's authority and must con-
stitute a reasonable exercise of discretion.
The starting point is the statutes themselves. If a statute spe-
cifically identifies the character of activity that may be prohibited
via a civil protection order, then due process of law-making will be
satisfied. If, however, a statute lacks specificity or includes a catch-
all clause, such as one permitting a judge to order "such other relief
as the court deems necessary for the protection of a victim of do-
mestic violence,"' 441 then it may be inequitable and perhaps uncon-
stitutional to bind a defendant-particularly an uncounseled
defendant-to an order that broadly restrains her freedom.
Under many CPO statutes, a defendant can be ordered to leave
her residence, 442 not communicate with the victim,443 give up custody
of her children,4 " stay away from certain public places, 445 and attend
counseling sessions.- Orders may be modified but, unless modified,
they remain in effect for months, a year, or even longer with re-
newals." 7 Although these orders ultimately may not actually abridge
constitutional rights relating to the parent-child relationship, free-
dom of speech and association, or freedom of movement, they do
implicate these constitutionally protected values. In other contexts
the Supreme Court has made it clear that constitutional values, even
Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that ex parte order
effectively denying ex-husband's right to visit his child prior to hearing did not violate
procedural due process).
440. E.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 586-4(b) (Supp. 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN § 173-B:6
(Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(D)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1991).
441. FLA. STAT. AN. § 741.30(7)(a)6. (West Supp. 1986).
442. E.g., MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3(c) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1991).
443. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10186(a)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
444. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2312-14(b)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
445. E.g., Omao PEv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
446. E.g., TEX. F ,. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(5) (Vernon 1991).
447. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (Supp. 1990); WIs. STAT. ANN § 813.12(4)(c)
(West Supp. 1990).
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if not directly in issue, can and should inform and restrain the scope
of court orders enforced through contempt. 448
B. Enforcing the Order-The Matter of Private Prosecution
Most CPO statutes contemplate that the victim of domestic abuse
not only will seek the original civil order but also will enforce it
through a contempt proceeding if there is a violation. 449 This victim-
enforcement feature raises a thorny due process question: may a pri-
vate party act as prosecutor in a contempt enforcement proceed-
ing?450
448. See Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 633-34 (1990). In Spallone a majority
of the Court, relying on traditional equitable principles, held that a district court abused
its discretion by ordering contempt citations against individual city council members for
failure to vote for an ordinance. The contempt order followed the council members' refusal
to vote for legislation implementing a consent decree entered into by the city and plaintiffs
after a lengthy lawsuit finding Yonkers guilty of intentional racial discrimination in city
housing. In concluding that the district court's order against the councilmembers went too
far, the Court reasoned that the order against the councilmen was "extraordinary" and that
a step less drastic, namely imposing fines on the city itself, should have been tried first. Id.
at 634-35. The action against the councilmembers was extraordinary because, although
neither the constitutional speech and debate clause nor common law legislative immunity
were at stake, the considerations underlying those protections "must inform the District
Court's exercise of its discretion," id. at 634, particularly the idea that "any restriction on
a legislator's freedom undermines the public good by interfering with the rights of the
people to representation in the democratic process." Id.
449. In enforcement actions there are sometimes questions regarding precisely who may
bring an enforcement action-who has "standing" to assert the violation. If the state obtains
an injunction against a person prohibiting violation of civil rights, or an order restraining
use of a residence as a place for illegal drug sales or prostitution, or secures a protective
order on behalf of a battered woman and her family against the husband's return to the
household or against further assaults against family members, who may commence and
prosecute an action for violation of the injunction? May the victims of the racial attacks,
or the neighbors of the drug or prostitution house, or the daughter of the battered woman
seek an order to show cause why the wrongdoer should not be held in contempt?
It is clear that if the affected individuals themselves had obtained the original injunction,
they would be its beneficiaries and as such they could seek enforcement. If the applicable
statutes so provide, these persons still may be "beneficiaries" even though the original
injunction was sought by the state. Otherwise the legislature may have contemplated that
victims or persons associated with a victim bring facts of noncompliance before governmental
authorities and request that the government, in its discretion, go forward to enforce the
injunction. These questions are essentially matters of statutory construction.
450. The matter has arisen in a number of contempt enforcement cases. E.g., Castellanos
v. Novoa, No. IF-858-87, mem. op. at 10, 15-16 (D.C. Super. Ct. April 27, 1989). A
different set of issues is presented by the enforcement role taken by a plaintiff in qui tam
actions. Some have argued that a self-selected, self-interested private "prosecutor" consti-
tutionally is disabled from recovering for the government in qui tam cases. See Caminker,
The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 345-46 (1989); Lewis,
Environmentalists' Authority to Sue Industry For Civil Penalties Is Unconstitutional Under
the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10101, 10104 (1986).
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The question of private prosecution arises against the backdrop
of the Supreme Court's decision in Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils S.A. 451 In the context of a commercial dispute, the
Court there acknowledged the authority of courts, on the motion of
a party, to initiate prosecutions for criminal contempt. It even ac-
knowledged the courts' authority to appoint private prosecutors to
litigate the case. 452 However, the Court, relying on its supervisory
power over the lower federal courts, held that the district court erred
in appointing as prosecutor counsel for an interested party.453
The Court's decision left open the question whether due process
requires prosecution of contempt by a disinterested prosecutor. The
one court that has considered the issue in the context of a civil pro-
tection order determined that due process does not impose such a
requirement. 454 That court's rationale was that the "interest" at issue
in Young-which involved extensive investigative tactics and ex-
tremely valuable commercial property-was dramatically more com-
promising than that which exists in an ordinary CPO case. The court
stated:
[Pletitioner has been previously determined to be a victim of do-
mestic violence and now seeks the court's assistance, through the
statutorily authorized criminal contempt process, to protect her from
respondent because he allegedly failed to comply with the provisions
of the court's previous order and abused her again. This court is
convinced that the Young Court could not possibly have envisioned
the application of its rather sweeping language dealing with prob-
lems associated with private prosecution of contempt under the fed-
eral rules to the instant and most similar cases. 455
Moreover, in weighing any harm to the defendant, which in this
case was thought to be negligible given the criminal procedural pro-
The argument proceeds on two theories. One is that the prosecutorial function belongs to
the executive and that Congress may not, consistent with separation of powers, assign such
a law enforcement function to a private citizen. The other is that the private citizen, by
definition, has no interest in the litigation and, therefore, does not meet the standing
requirements of Article III. Both are arguments explored carefully and then rejected in
Caminker, at 345-49.
Both arguments are answered easily in the CPO context. First, as with qui tam actions,
the executive branch can retain the right to take over or dismiss the private party's
prosecution, and therefore the executive really retains its prosecutorial role and merely
authorizes its delegation. Second, in a CPO case there really is no standing issue because
the victim, unlike the qui tam informer, is the injured party.
451. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
452. Id. at 793.
453. Id. at 790.
454. Castellanos v. Novoa, No. IF-858-87, mem. op. at 15-16 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 27,
1989).
455. Id. at 14.
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tections surrounding a contempt proceeding, the court factored in
the reality that without private prosecutions CPOs would be largely
unenforceable.
Insofar as the court's calculus aimed at due process accuracy
concerns, its decision seems correct. Yet, there remains the concern
that lies at the heart of a requirement of disinterestedness: a doubt
whether the case ever would have been brought at all, and whether
it was brought to gain advantage in collateral matters. These con-
cerns are real and not adequately accounted for by a rule that simply
declares CPO contempt to be different from other contempt.
It is true, of course, that CPO contempt enforcement involves
"crimes" that can be classified as petty, that CPO enforcement will
be rendered largely ineffective without some measure of victim en-
forcement, and that the legislature primarily was interested in cre-
ating a CPO regime as a plan of protection for victims and not to
protect the integrity of court orders per se. Yet a CPO contempt
enforcement remains a criminal prosecution and as such implicates
not only justice for a victim and fairness to the accused, but also
society's interest in an objective, fair, and reliable process of guilt
adjunction. As Justice Brennan noted in Young, "What is at stake
is the public perception of the integrity of our criminal justice
system.' '456
As a result of these concerns, courts and commentators have
concluded-though by no means uniformly-that, despite the his-
torical practice of private prosecution by victims, prosecution by an
interested prosecutor violates due process of law. 457 Not all forms of
interest, however, will render a prosecutor ineligible to prosecute.
Although a direct pecuniary interest is always fatal,458 courts have
found some conflicts to be too remote to raise a real danger that the
defendant's or the public's interest in impartial prosecution will be
compromised in favor of private desires. 4 9 This suggests that if the
nature and extent of the private prosecutor's personal interests can
be held in check, or if the influence of personal interest can be min-
imized, then prosecution by a private party or victim might be tol-
erated.
456. Young, 481 U.S. at 811.
457. See, e.g., Note, Private Prosecutors In Criminal Contempt Actions Under Rule
42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1141, 1148-62
(1986) (authored by Frank McCay).
458. E.g., United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 926 (1982).
459. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 251-52 (1980).
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A victim in a CPO enforcement can have one or more conflicts,
ranging from spite and vindictiveness to seeking an advantage in re-
lated litigation involving divorce, child custody, or award of alimony
and child support. Unless we are willing to establish case-by-case
assessments of the existence and extent of these conflicts, assuming
we even know how to measure spite or vindictiveness, the only po-
tential solution to the interest problem appears to be a structural
solution. The danger from conflict seems to arise at three critical
points-the decision to prosecute, the use of investigating machinery,
and the decision to dismiss or plea bargain. If a CPO enforcement
regime includes the prosecutor's review of the decision to charge, a
ban on the victim's independent authority to investigate, and the pro-
secutor's review of any settlement or plea bargain, the effect of con-
flict may be neutralized sufficiently to be tolerable from a due process
perspective.
C. Double Jeopardy
Defendants who are held in criminal contempt for violation of
a protective order sometimes face a subsequent prosecution for a
criminal act that gave rise to the contempt proceedings. A defendant,
for example, may have been found guilty of contempt and later pros-
ecuted for assault or kidnapping. State courts facing this issue usually
have found a way to surmount the double jeopardy challenge and
permit the subsequent prosecution to proceed. 4" 0 The results, how-
ever, have not always been in accord with double jeopardy principles.
Initially, there can be no question that double jeopardy poten-
tially applies in such situations. Both proceedings are criminal pro-
secutions; thus, new doctrines, such as that announced in United
States v. Halper46' for civil proceedings, are not relevant. Courts that
purport to avoid the double jeopardy issue by simply stating that
criminal contempts are not criminal prosecutions are in error. 462
Whether double jeopardy is, in fact, a bar will depend on the
nature of the defendant's action and how the government has chosen
to proceed. Double jeopardy's twin protections-against being twice
460. See, e.g., Baggett v. State, 15 Ark. App. 113, 690 S.W.2d 362 (1985) (no double
jeopardy bar to kidnapping prosecution as to defendant previously held in contempt for
violating protective order); People v. Allen, 787 P.2d 174 (Colo. App. 1979) (no double
jeopardy bar to assault prosecution as to defendant previously held in criminal contempt).
461. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
462. See People v. McGraw, 138 Misc. 2d 349, 524 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1988); Eichenlaub v.
Eichenlaub, 33 Pa. D & C.3d 59 (Allegheny Co. 1983) aff'd 340 Pa. Super. 552, 490 A.2d
918 (1985).
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punished for the same offense and against multiple prosecutions for
the same offense-are implicated in different ways. 463 First, as to
double punishments, a defendant may face multiple punishments if
the legislature clearly indicates that violation of a protection order
is an offense separate from other crimes and if the prosecution of
each offense depends on proving a fact that the other does not.46
Both conditions usually can be established because legislatures have
specified that violation of a protection order is a separate crime and,
ordinarily, violation of the order will encompass behavior broader
than a simple criminal offense like assault. 465 Sometimes, however,
there is a single wrong, and it is plain that the same offense is in
issue. The Oregon Supreme Court, for example, decided that con-
tempt for violating an injunction against trespassing on a neighbor's
property was the same offense as criminal trespass.4 66 Moreover, it
is doubtful that proof of the existence of a protective order as a nec-
essary element in the prosecution for violation of the order is ad-
equate to distinguish offenses that are otherwise precisely the same.4 7
Double jeopardy, however, protects against more than just dou-
ble punishments for the same offense. Even if it is true, as some
courts have held, 48 that violation of a contempt order and com-
mission of an underlying crime such as assault can be deemed sep-
arate offenses, further analysis is necessary. An individual may be
subject to two punishments for these "separate offenses," but the
government may have to exact that punishment in a single, as op-
posed to multiple, proceeding. If, in the subsequent prosecution, even
if for a "separate offense," the government can only prove the sec-
ond charge by proving the same conduct for which the defendant
already was found guilty, double jeopardy will bar the second action
as a multiple prosecution.
The double jeopardy issue is sufficiently serious that prosecutors
must take some care lest protection order contempt prosecutions in-
advertently preclude prosecution for other, perhaps more serious,
463. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
464. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
465. See People v. Totten, 118 Ill. 2d 124, 514 N.E.2d 959 (1987).
466. State v. Thompson, 294 Or. 528, 659 P.2d 383 (1983).
467. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 404 F. Supp. 619, 622 (D.C.D.C.
1975), the court held that a prosecution for price-fixing barred a prosecution for criminal
contempt for violating an injunction not to fix prices. The same conduct violated both the
injunction and the substantive law and the district court belittled the importance of the
existence of the injunction as an additional element in the violation. Id.
468. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, 506 Pa. 500, 486 A.2d 363, 368-69 (1984)
(holding that indirect criminal contempt and other criminal charges are distinct offenses
requiring separate elements of proof and vindicating different interests).
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crimes. This can be achieved by imposing a requirement on parties
seeking contempt enforcement to notify the prosecutor and by rules
permitting the prosecutor to intervene in or stay the contempt action.
These same rules also will tend to soften the due process conflict of
interest presented by victim prosecution of contempt.
VIII. Conclusion
We are in the midst of fundamentally altering the way we ap-
proach criminal justice problems. Law enforcement authorities are
no longer content to fight crime with the traditional methods of ar-
rest, prosecution, and jailing. They have observed that crimes such
as fraud, extortion, and drug dealing are often complex phenomena
involving networks of criminals, subtle and complex business trans-
actions, and societal acquiescence or tolerance. In response, law en-
forcement officials have enlisted civil remedies-particularly asset
forfeiture-and have begun to rely on private law suits. Encouraged
by their initial success, they have pressed the merger of traditional
criminal and civil remedies to reach a broad spectrum of antisocial
behavior.
The systematic joinder of criminal and civil remedies presents
unusual challenges to a legal system largely built on the idea that the
criminal and civil law are separate and distinct. This Article has ad-
dressed only one set of issues that must be confronted, namely Bill
of Rights limitations on the use of hybrid or multiple remedies. It
has had to begin by offering a coherent basis on which to distinguish
criminal from civil proceedings because the Constitution itself em-
bodies a separation between the two. But, important as that effort
is and may prove to be in the future, this Article has also sought to
show when, constitutionally speaking, the distinction should be ig-
nored.
More work remains to be done. The widespread blending of
criminal and civil remedies strains the capacity of our bifurcated pro-
cedural systems to accommodate hybrid forms of action. It obscures
the boundary line between governmental and private action in ap-
plying constitutional and legislative limits on "state action." More-
over, it presses us to consider whether prosecutor's offices formally
should be reorganized along problem-solving, regulatory lines. At the
moment, law enforcement practices are running ahead of our legal
theories and our procedural systems. This Article is just one step
toward catching up.

